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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
Going Against The Grain: The Regulation of the 
International Wheat Trade from 1933 to the 
1980 Soviet Grain Embargo. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The world wheat trade is presently characterized by competing and conflicting 
goals and policies.! The sharpest conflicts appear between the goals and policies 
sought by the international community and those pursued domestically by indi-
vidual countries,2 but conflicts also exist within the internationaP and domestic 
spheres themselves. 4 While there is general agreement that a supply of wheat 
adequate to feed the world's people as well as to provide security against crop 
failures or reduced production due to adverse weather conditions is necessary,S 
I. Malmgren & Schlechty, Ratilmalizing World Agricultural Traile, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. SIS, 536-37 
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Malmgren & Schlecty]. 
2. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE INSTABILITY OF AGRICUL-
TURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as OECD]. 
[d. 
Policy action aimed at coping with market instability has been taken mainly at the domestic 
level and to a much lesser extent at the international level ... A basic problem which needs to 
be considered in the context of these efforts is the extent to which stabilization measures taken 
at a national level contribute to or impair the stabilization of the world market. 
3. A U.S. official attending the first meeting of the World Food Council gave this description of the 
meeting: 
The worst meeting of an international organization ever. . . everyone we talked to agreed 
that the meeting was chaotic and a fiasco. A State Department official said that the official 
report of the meeting was an imaginative piece of fiction because it made it appear that 
business was conducted and action taken. In reality, the meeting was totally disrupted by 
squabbling between developing and developed countries, between developing countries and 
Council staff, and among many developing countries. 
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STUDY BY THE STAFF OF THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL FOOD ORGANIZATIONS: PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 15 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as U.S. PARTICIPATION]. 
4. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CoNGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES, GRAIN RESERVES: A POTENTIAL U.S. FOOD POLICY TOOL 8 (1976) [hereinafter cited 
as GRAIN RESERVES]. 
[d. 
Traditionally, U.S. agricultural policy has had three general objectives: (1) Maintaining the 
productive base by attempting to stabilize agricultural prices and increase farmers' incomes. (2) 
Protecting the domestic consumers of agricultural products by attempting to provide adequate 
supplies at reasonable prices. (3) Exporting agricultural surpluses for commercial, humanita-
rian, and political purposes. In the past, conflicts among these objectives did not receive much 
attention because the farm sector tended to produce surpluses. There was sufficient produc. 
tion to satisfy perceived commercial as well as humanitarian needs. With the recent transition 
from surpluses to relative scarcity, goal conflicts have become obvious and a new goal, supply 
stability, is emerging in response to our uncertainty that production can satisfy needs. 
5. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ENVIRONMENT POLICY DIVISIONS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 93D 
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considerably less agreement exists on how this goal can be balanced' with other 
goals which must be met in a successful international wheat trade. These goals 
include: maintenance of farmer income,6 stabilization of prices,7 control of 
production,8 liberalization of world trade,9 growth of agriculture self-sufficiency 
of developing countries,lo and provision for the hungry of the world through 
the development of a world food reserveY While each of these goals is pursued 
at the domestic level,12 and less directly, at the international level,13 domestic 
policies are primarily concerned with the maintenance of farmer income, the 
stabilization of prices, and derivatively, with the control of production and the 
liberalization of world trade. 14 The author will focus on the complexity which 
arises in the international wheat trade through the interaction of basic domestic 
wheat policies and the international regulatory schemes and policies which exist. 
This Comment will examine the operation and regulation of the international 
wheat trade with emphasis on the degree to which such regulation has achieved 
its goals. Both past and present international wheat agreements will be examined 
with a focus on the lessons they may contain and the direction they may point out 
for the future of international wheat trade regulation. 
CONG., 2D SESS., INTERNATIONAL FOOD RESERVES: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT PROPOSALS 30 (Comm. 
Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL FOOD RESERVES]. 
6. Schram, International Repercussions of National Farm Policies: A Look at American Wheat Programs, 3 
LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 239,245 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Schram]. 
7. Cf U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES, II ISSUES SURROUNDING THE MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, 5-6 
(1977) (ramifications of price fluctuations). 
8. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REpORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES, AGRICULTURE's IMPLEMENTATION OF GAO's WHEAT EXPORT SUBSIDY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND RELATED MATTERS 7-8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as AGRICULTURE'S IMPLEMENTATION]. 
9. Schram, supra note 6, at 271-92. 
10. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES, DISINCENTIVES TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN DEVEWPING COUNTRIES 32 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as DISINCENTIVES]. 
II. OECD, supra note 2, at 13. 
12. See josling, Domestic Agricultural Price Policies and Their Interaction Through Trade, in IMPERFECT 
MARKETS IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE 49-50 (A. McCalla & T. josling eds. 1981). See also OECD, supra note 
2, at 48. 
Id. 
13. OECD, supra note 2, at 3. The OECr· report notes that with respect to this issue: 
Policy action aimed at coping with market instability has been taken mainly at the domestic 
level and to a much lesser extent at the international level. Governments' efforts have been 
only partly successful, largely because either they have been piecemeal in approach or not 
taken account of fundamental market forces, or because they did not achieve a sufficiently 
widespread acceptance to ensure enduring success. A basic problem which needs to be consid-
ered in the context of these efforts is the extent to which stabilization measures taken at a 
national level contribute to or impair the stabilization of the world market. 
14. See, e.g., Special Address by Hubert H. Humphrey, The Farmer's Stake in World Trade, reprinted 
in THE NATIONAl. FARM INSTITUTE, FARM PROSPERITY - IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 24-30 (1965). 
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I I. SUPPLY AND DEMA:-';D 
The fundamental purpose of government intervention in the wheat trade is to 
protect the income of wheat producers. lo Therefore, the price received per 
bushel of wheat produced is critically important. Price Huctuates in response to 
changes in the supply and demand of a product, I" and generally, for primary 
commodities l7 such as wheat, the major cause of price instability is the tendency 
for production to exceed demand. IH For primary commodities, price Huctuations 
with respect to supply and demand also tend to be cyclical. I" When demand for a 
commodity increases, prices rise until a sufficient supply is produced to meet the 
demand. 20 However, because of such factors as weather,21 insects, disease and 
the lag time between planting, harvesting and utilization of wheat,2z the equilib-
15. Wheeler, Governmental Intervention in World Trade in Wheat, 1 J. WORLD TRADE L. 379, 
383 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler]. 
16. P. BARKLEY & D. SECKLER, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECAY 76 (1972). When 
supply is equal to demand at a price acceptable to both producer and consumer, the price received is 
referred to as the equilibrium price. When either or both supply and demand shift, market forces 
compel producer and consumer readjustments in the market so that a new equilibrium price is reached. 
Id. 
17. Primary commodity is defined as "any product of farm, forest, or fishery or any mineral, in its 
natural form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for 
marketing in substantial volume in international trade." U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, 
HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION art. 56, U.N. Doc. No. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948) 
[hereinafter cited as HAVANA CHARTER]. See also notes 95-108 and accompanying text infra. 
18. Note, International Commodity Agreements: Purpose, Policy, and Procedure, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 784 
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Intf'Tnationai Commodity Agreements]. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. OECD, supra note 2, at 78-80. 
The importance of the weather in determining the size of the harvest is such that all OECD 
governments have measures (distinct or combined with other measures) to cope with weather 
induced risks. But a more immediate and practical consequence for the international 
market of government involvement is that the weather alone is not so much an important 
factor as governments' response to the weather. Or, more accurately, it is the weather com-
bined with government action that is an important factor for instability in the international 
market. 
Id. See also W. HElD, JR., U.S. WHEAT INDUSTRY 17 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Eeon., Stat. and Coop. Serv., 
Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 432, 1979) [hereinafter cited as HElD]. 
Id. 
The U.S. overproduction problem was quickly, but temporarily, solved when weather condi-
tions reduced wheat crops in many countries in 1972. U.S. wheat acreage was sharply increased 
beginning in 1973. Production topped 2 billion bushels (54.4 million metric tons) in 1975 for 
the first time, and again in 1976 and 1977. When world weather conditions improved, the 
United States found itself once again with large carryovers and low prices - repeating a 
pattern common since 1950 of low supplies followed by large surplus. 
22. HElD, supra note 21, at 43. One way for producers to minimize the time lag risk is by "hedging" in 
futures contracts where some of the uncertainty about ownership of a commodity is transferred to the 
purchaser of the commodity under a futures contract. Under the futures contract, the producer agrees 
to furnish a specific quantity of the commodity at a specific price on a certain future date. Although 
futures contracts are used extensively in the grain trade, farmers are not responsible for very much of 
the hedging. Id. 
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rium point between supply and demand is difficUl to ascertain. 23 Because of this 
difficulty, too many producers, enticed by the hig 'er selling prices, are lured 
into production, and, as a consequence, overpro,'uction results and prices 
drop.24 As prices drop, less efficient producers are forced from the market, 
thereby diminishing production. The ensuing decrease in supply causes prices to 
rise again. 25 As prices increase, new producers again enter into the market and 
the cycle resumes. 26 
To complicate matters, however, agricultural products tend to deviate from 
this basic supply and demand pattern. Farmers often increase their production 
when the market is depressed in order to maintain the income necessary to meet 
their fixed expenses. This increased production, in turn, drives prices down even 
further. 27 Additionally, overproduction today results both from new producers 
who enter the market when prices are up and from increased yields due to 
advances in technology .28 In the case of wheat, the supply and demand pattern is 
further complicated by the fact that the demand for wheat as food with respect 
to the price of wheat is relatively inelastic,29 such that an increase or decrease in 
the price of wheat is not matched by a corresponding increase or decrease in the 
demand for wheat. This means, for example, that a 20% increase in the price of 
wheat will result in less than a 20% decrease in the consumption of wheat.30 This 
low demand elasticity for wheat is significant on both the international and 
domestic levels because in order to maintain an adequate price, the supply 
variable must be manipulated.3 ! 
Price support policies32 have been adopted by many governments33 in order to 
bolster farmers' income. However, since these policies further complicate the 
supply and demand pattern by artificially raising the price farmers receive, these 
policies stimulate production and increase the likelihood of surplus. 34 Far from 
23. Internatianal Commodity Agreements, supra note 18, at 784. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 785. 
26.Id. 
27. HElD, supra note 21, at 14 n. 9. 
28. See Wheeler, supra note 15, at 386; SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 93D CONG., 
1ST SESS., AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND THE PROPOSED ROUND OF MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS [FLANIGAN 
REPORT] 85 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as FLANIGAN REPORT]' 
29. HElD, supra note 21, at 43. 
30.Id. 
31. See The International Wheat Agreement: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1979) [hereinafter cited as International Wheat Agreement: Hearing] 
(statement of Mr. Dale Hathaway, Under-Secretary of Agriculture). 
32. "Price supports" are "[g]overnment regulations, usually involving some form of public subsidy or 
financial aid to producers; designed to keep market prices from falling below a certain minimum level." 
HElD, supra note 21, at 114. 
33. For a review of the price programs in Australia, Canada, and the European Community, see 
FLANIGAN REPORT, supra note 28, at 89-95. For a review of American price support policy, see Schram, 
supra note 6, at 247-51. 
34. See Schram, supra note 6, at 247-49. 
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helping to alleviate the basic price problem, price support policies aggravate the 
overproduction trend35 by putting additional downward pressure on the market 
price. The cost of these price support policies is also expensive for both 
governments and taxpayers. 36 Price support policies encourage the proliferation 
of import and tariff barriers,37 since the presence of cheaper foreign wheat in 
the domestic market erodes domestic price, provides a diminished return to the 
farmer, and ultimately, requires compensation in the form of a hike in price 
supports. 38 The government must then institute export subsidies because higher 
price supports result in higher profits from domestic sales of wheat as compared 
to export sales.39 Without the export subsidy, therefore, farmers would provide 
surplus quantities of wheat to the domestic market, and thereby increase the 
downward pressure on the price of wheat.40 
III. SUPPLY MANAGEMENT 
Though modification of supply is critical to the maintenance of an adequate 
wheat price,41 consistent and workable production controls have been lacking in 
the modern history of the grain trade. 42 The United States has utilized several 
different forms of production controls since the end of World War I. In recent 
times, these controls have included the establishment of a 55 million acre na-
35. See D. HADWIGER, FEDERAL WHEAT COMMODITY PROGRAMS 175 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
HADWIGERj. 
Id. 
High price supports were regarded as the main source of farm trouble. It was assumed that 
wheat production had been increased by high wartime prices. Continuation of these price 
levels into peacetime by virtue of price supports had caused surpluses, both by discouraging 
adjustments to smaller markets and by pricing some products too high to be competitive in all 
potential markets. For wheat, price was not regarded as a barrier to food markets so long as the 
federal government subsidized exports, but it was assumed by the Benson administration that 
less wheat would have been produced if prices had been lower. 
36. See FLANIGAN REPORT, supra note 28, at 4. Dr. D. Gale Johnson of the University of Chicago 
estimates that the annual world cost of import barriers and domestic price supports and subsidies may 
approximate $40 billion, $13 billion in the European Community and almost $10 billion in the United 
States.ld. 
37. See C. JABARA & A. BRIGlDA. VARIABLE LEVIES: BARRIERS TO GRAIN IMPORTS IN FRANCE, THE 
NETHERLANDS, FEDERAL REpUBUC OF GERMANY, AND UNITED KINGDOM I (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Econ., 
Stat. and Coop. Serv., Foreign Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 156, 1980) [hereinafter cited as VARIABLE LEVIESj. 
38. Schram, supra note 6, at 270. 
39.Id. 
40.Id. 
41. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra. 
42. Malmgren & Schlechty, supra note I, at 2. "In most of the countries where surpluses are 
accumulating, there are no conscious policies of production restraint and no capacity for storage." Id. 
But see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL POUCY IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFlCEj, which notes the removal of incentives 
to withhold land from production after the severity of the 1972-1974 food shortage became apparent. 
After decades of dealing with surplus situations, the 1972-1974 shortage experience emphasized that 
there are also high costs in "underproduction" during times of crop failure, flood or drought. Id. 
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tional allotment in 1938,43 the 1956 Soil Bank Act, under which farmers 
voluntarily placed about 29 million cropland acres in reserve at an average 
annual rental rate of $11.85 per acre,44 and the Agricultural Act of 1964.45 
Congress designed these programs to control production with a minimum of 
burden to the farmer. 46 However, these production controls were not successful, 
overall. Often, these "production controls" were in actuality "acreage controls" as 
opposed to true production controls,47 and increased yields offset the effects of 
these "production controls" and, thus, led to surplus production.4H 
The United States has had to bear much of the burden of production control 
for the world,49 especially in the 1950's and 1960's.50 For example, while the 
United States reduced wheat acreage in 1965 in response to the actual world 
market surplus of wheat, world wheat acreage increased rapidly as the other 
major exporters increased production in anticipation of increased exports to the 
43. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, § 333, 52 Stat. 53 (1938) (current version at 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1281 (1973». For the national wheat acreage allotments from 1955-1964, see 1 CONGo Q. 679 (1945-
1964). 
44. Soil Bank Act ofl956, 7 U.S.C. § 1801 (1973), repealed by Act of Nov. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-321, 
§ 601, 79 Stat. 1206 (1965). See also HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 210-31. There were actually two soil bank 
programs. Under the "acreage reserve," farmers could retire land previously planted with wheat (or 
other basic commodities) and receive payments from the government. Participation was voluntary. 
Under the "conservation reserve," contracts were signed from 1956-1960 for retirement of any type of 
productive land and its conversion to specified conservation practices for periods of 3-15 years from the 
date of contract. Participant farmers were paid for retiring the land and for up to eighty percent of the 
cost of the conservation practices. 
45. The Agriculture Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. § 1339 (1964) amend£d by Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 404, 91 Stat. 
927 (1977) (amendment makes § 1339 inapplicable to the 1978-1981 wheat crops) [hereinafter cited as 
Agriculture Act of 1964]. See also HElD, supra note 21, at 65. Farmers who complied with wheat 
allotments based on a national wheat allotment of 49.5 million acres would be eligible for 1964 supports 
of about $2.00 a bushel on wheat grown for domestic use, $1.55 a bushel on wheat grown for export, 
and $1.30 a bushel on the remainder of the crop to be used for seed and animal feed. Non-compliers 
received no support payments and had to be content with the market price for wheat, approximately 
$1.30 a bushel. Agriculture Act of 1964, supra, § 203. 
46. HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 215-16, 257. 
47. See HElD, supra note 21, at 16. The production and carryover statistics for the United States from 
1950-1978 reflect a slight overall decrease in acreage harvested. [d. 
48. [d. at 14. See also GRAIN RESERVES, supra note 4, at 20. 
Production management by acreage controls has traditionally been difficult to monitor. If the 
farmer does participate in the program, he tends to set aside marginally productive land which 
has limited impact on total production. If the farmer perceives that crop prices are adequate 
for him, he may not even participate in the program. 
/d. This study also points out the positive aspects of "intensity controls" as opposed to acreage controls. 
Intensity controls would influence "input" in a crop, such as pesticides, fertilizers, energy and ma-
chinery. This form of control might also, in the long run, encourage conservation of energy and soil 
fertility. [d. 
49. Multilateral Trade Negotiations Briefing: Hearing Bifore the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1979) (statement of Mr. Thomas Saylor, Associate Administrator, 
Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture) [hereinafter cited as Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations Briefing]. 
50. HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 78-79. 
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new communist markets. 51 The "world surplus" was effectively hidden or iso-
lated from the international commercial market because of V.S. storage and 
surplus disposal programs. 52 Other countries often adopted price support poli-
cies with no production controls.53 Aside from the sporadic efforts at production 
control by other exporters, most notably eftiJrts by Canada and Australia in the 
late 1960's in response to the drastic domestic surplus situation;>4 little of any 
real substance or effect has been done to curb world production in a consistent 
manner. This situation has not only been inequitable to the United States, it has 
also been grossly ineffective. 55 
Along with production controls, wheat producers frequently propose and 
adopt a reserve or "buffer stock" scheme to deal with the short-term Huctuations 
of price which result from surplus wheat. 56 Proponents of the reserve system 
note that it could be used effectively on both the domestic and international 
levels, provided that domestic reserve policies are coordinated with any interna-
tional system of nationally held reserves. 57 Governments consider a system of 
domestically held, internationally controlled reserves to be more appealing than 
an "international" reserve because many countries perceive, not inaccurately, 
that under an internationally controlled system, they might lose much of the 
control over their own agricultural programs and decisions. 56 Though there are 
different operating schemata. fi)r reserve systems,5~ the basic functioning of an 
effective reserve involves the purchase of stocks from the market when either a 
supply increase or a demand decrease causes farm prices to fall below a specified 
level. 60 Conversely, when prices rise to a certain specified level - a sign that 
demand is strong and supplies are tight - producers release stocks into the 
market. fJ1 Thus, one desirable aspect of a buffer scheme is that it does not 
51. Id. Multilateral Tead, Negotiations Briefing. supra note 49, at 32. 
52. Id. 
53. FLAN1GA" REPORT, supra note 28, at 3. 
54. S" note 246 and accompanying text infra. 
55. Multilatrral Trade Negotiations Briefing, supra note 49, at 32. The United States was hoping to alter 
this state of affairs. "I think a starting point in terms of cooperation would be what additional [sic] could 
we expect from the standpoint of adjustment that our trading partners would undertake. We are 
interested in cooperating, but \";e view cooperation as necessarily a two-way street." ld. 
56. See Katz, International Commadil'! Po/ii,\', DEP'T ST. BULL. Mar. 1978 at 1,2 [hereinafter cited as 
Katz]. In addition to remedying short term price Huctuations, one author suggests such a reserve could 
provide substantial insurance against major famine emergency in the poorest countries. P. TREZISE, 
RFBUILDl"G GRAIN RESERVES 59 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TREZISE]. This aspect of the reserve would 
be an "integral part of the larger stabilization reserve, \vith some form of ear marking to assure its 
availability in a famine situation. It would be financed largely or entirely by the high-income partici-
pants, and its use would depend upon an internationally approved set of criteria." Id. 
57. See CO"GRESSIONAL BLDGFT OFFICE, supra note 42, at 63. 
58. Id. at 63-64. 
59. For a review of reserve policy models, Sn' GRAIl'i RESERVES, supra note 4, at 56-86. 
60. CO.'.lGRESSIO:"JAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 63. 
61. Ir!. 
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replace market forces in the attempt to stabilize prices, but instead uses the 
market's own forces toward that end.62 
Central to any reserve scheme are the specified prices which trigger interven-
tion in the form of either the buying or selling of stocks in the market. Because of 
the importance of trigger prices, many of the disputes which arise during 
debates over the adoption of reserve schemes, especially at the international 
level, revolve around setting such prices.63 Also important to a successful reserve 
scheme is that intervention prices and the size of the stocks in the reserve should 
be flexibly structured so that the marketplace dictates "adjustments."64 
The mere existence of reserves, however, has a price-depressing effect on the 
market. The U.S. government-controlled domestic reserves, which have histori-
cally "sat" on the grain market and depressed prices, demonstrate this effect.65 
Because of this price-depressing effect, farmers groups, along with other export-
ing countries, including Canada, Australia, Argentina, and, most notably, the 
USSR,66 have expressed much more satisfaction with farmer-controlled reserves 
than government-controlled reserves. 67 United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) Undersecretary of International Affairs and Commodity Pro-
grams, Dale E. Hathaway, testified at a 1979 Senate hearing that a farmer-
controlled reserve had a "substantial and significant positive price supporting 
effect during the period of [the 1 reserve accumulation, at a time when world 
supply was relatively large compared to demand."68 One concern that arises 
under a farmer reserve program, however, is that it dampens the incentives for 
importing countries, especially developing countries, to intensively seek self-
62. Katz, supra note 56, at 2. 
63. See, e.g., International Wheat Agreement: Hearing, supra note 31, at 16-17, which notes that one of the 
causes of the February 1979 breakdown in negotiations on a new International Wheat Agreement was 
the insistence by importing countries on price levels for reserve stock accumulation that would not have 
guaranteed an adequate producer return and upon trigger prices that would have precipitated early 
stock release at upper levels, thus failing to provide any real protection from extreme market rises. 
64. TREZISE, supra note 56, at 42. See also Gerhard, Commodity Trade Stabilization Through International 
Agreements, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 276, 284 [hereinafter cited as Gerhard]. 
Id. 
In general, the narrower the range between the agreed-upon intervention prices, the greater 
will be the stabilizing effect of the scheme.. . . The more frequently the price range is revised 
and the greater the weight given to the more recent market prices, the longer will be the life 
expectancy of a buffer stock scheme, but the smaller will be its importance as price stabilizer. 
65. GRAIN RESERVES, supra note 4, at 26-27. 
66. International Grain Agreements Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Agricultural Policy, 
Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
International Grain Agreements Oversight]. The Soviet Union's opinion reflects their realization that while 
the farmer's reserve results in their paying higher prices during years of excess supply, it also has the 
desirable effect of making substantially larger supplies available in world markets during shortage 
periods when the Soviets might need them. Overall, therefore, the Soviets felt this tradeoff worked to 
their benefit as well as to the benefit of producers. Id. 
67.Id. 
68.Id. 
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sufficiency in production, a necessary goal in light of the ever possible return to a 
severe shortage situation such as existed in 1972.69 An importing country's 
knowledge that a significant supply of wheat is available within a reasonable price 
range weakens the incentive for domestic production and substitution of other 
products, efforts which many importing countries would be forced to undertake 
if severe shortages and a need for export controls were to develop in the market 
place. 70 
IV. BACKGROUND ON THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL WHEAT TRADE 
Four countries have accounted for approximately 80%of the world's wheat 
exports since 1950. 71 The United States has accounted for the largest share of 
this market. 72 However, these same exporters have produced only slightly more 
than one-fifth of the world's wheat. 73 Although these exporters may share 
similar domestic goals,74 significant differences exist not only in the domestic 
policies75 each country adopts in pursuit of its goals,76 but also in the very 
structure of the various grain marketing systems. 77 
Philosophically, the free market approach is, and has been, the approach most 
acceptable to U.S. wheat farmers. 78 Thus, the United States allows its farmers to 
determine when, where and to whom they desire to sell their grain. 79 The free 
market affords greater flexibility to the farmer and the opportunity to make a 
fair return. 80 These factors are more desirable to U.S. farmers than a guarantee 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 9. 
71. International Wheat Agreement: Hearing, supra note 31, at 17. The four countries are the United 
States, Australia, Argentina and Canada. 
72. HEID, supra note 21, at 81. In 1973 and 1975 the U.S. share of the market was 43 percent. Id. 
73. International Wheat Agreement: Hearing, supra note 31, at 17. 
74. The goals include maintenance of farmer income, stabilization of prices, control of production 
and the liberalization of world trade. See § I supra. 
75. See, e.g., Schram, supra note 6, at 245. 
76. For a survey of the countries' policies, see International Grains Agreements Oversight, supra note 66, 
at 61. 
77. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES, GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEMS IN ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY; SOYBEAN MARKETING SYSTEM IN BRAZIL (1976) [hereinafter cited as GRAIN 
MARKETING SYSTEMS]. 
78. International Grain Agreements Oversight, supra note 66, at 57 (statement of Jerry Rees, Executive 
Vice President, National Association of Wheat Growers). "Wheat producers want market freedom, not 
restraints and they oppose the establishment of a government grain selling agency that would replace 
the present cooperative and private enterprise system." Id. 
79. Id. at 5-6. 
80. See International Wheat Agreement: Hearing, supra note 31, at 89 (statement of Joseph Halow, 
Executive Director, North American Export Grain Association, Inc.). 
The nation has really two alternatives in determining what should be its agricultural policy. It 
can choose to restrict markets, artificially raise prices and obligate the taxpayer to compensate 
234 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REvIEW [Vol. V, No. I 
of income through government control of the market.81 The other three leading 
exporters, and several importers, such as Japan and the Soviet Union, have 
government-controlled wheat or grain boards intended to insure adequate pro-
ducer returns.82 However, these wheat boards do not appear to have been any 
more successful than the United States in achieving their goals. 83 
In spite of the rhetoric of a free market, however, five giant international grain 
companies dominate the U.S. grain market and, consequently, in a very real 
sense, the world's grain trade. 84 Secrecy, an overwhelmingly vast network of 
shipping and storage facilities, and extensive information systems characterize 
these companies. 85 Though they are not the direct, or even the indirect, focus of 
the attempts to regulate the world wheat trade, a study of the trade must 
recognize these grain companies as a powerful force in the operation of the grain 
trade. 
Id. 
the farmer for his loss of markets. Or it can choose to liberalize trade, take advantage of the 
rapidly expanding world demand for grains, thereby permitting the farmer to make more 
efficient use of his land and equipment. He could thus improve his income through a healthy, 
naturally derived higher price for his grain and greater unit sales, without requiring recourse 
to public funds. 
81. Internatioool Grain Agreements Oversight, supra note 66, at 57. 
82. See GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEMS, supra note 77. 
83. See Internatioool Grain Agreements Oversight, supra note 66, at 22, 28. Indeed, in the view of the 
North American Export Grain Association, wheat producers have fared much worse under grain board 
marketing systems. Neither the North American Export Grain Association nor the Great Plains Wheat 
Association would endorse the adoption of a U.S. grain board. Id. 
84. D. MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 31 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN). The five interna-
tional grain companies referred to are Cargill, Inc. of Minneapolis, Minn., Continental Grain Company 
of New York City, Louis-Dreyfuss Company of Paris, Andre of Lausanne, Switzerland, and the Bunge 
Corporation of Brazil and New York. Though not the focus of this Comment, the grain companies are a 
prime, if not the prime, force in the world grain market, particularly wheat. According to Mr. Morgan 
there are two essential reasons for this predominance: the companies' possession of global information 
which others do not have, and the companies' integration of efficient transportation and storage 
facilities. The beneficial aspects of the companies are: 
They are efficient, and they do provide international services and take risks that nobody else 
does. They are progressive in their transcending of nationalism, their view of the planet as a 
single entity, and they even bridge the world's adversarial ideological blocs. The companies, say 
their admirers, are the most efficient organizations ever devised for transferring resources and 
wealth among countries. When the state takes over, a whole new set of problems comes to mind 
- inefficiency, bureaucracy, and managers who are subservient to political pressures. 
Id. at 324 (emphasis in original). The companies' dominance of the wheat market is exemplified by the 
fact that, although Canadian w heat sales are normally handled entirely through the state operated 
Canadian Wheat Board, the private companies have sometimes sold as much as thirty percent of 
Canada's wheat crop when harvests are large.Id. at 330. Furthermore, because of the companies' lack of 
political ideology, "they can go anywhere and do everything." This dominance was never so apparent as 
in the 1972 Russian grain sales where the companies provided a buffer between the Soviet and 
American governments and politics. !d. at 318. It should be remembered that the very reasons that 
make the companies so indispensable are those that make the companies ungovernable and impossible 
to regulate. For example, in July 1976, Cargill, Continental, and Bunge agreed to return $1.6 million of 
U.S. export subsidies on which they had profiteered in the summer of 1972 following the Russian grain 
sales of that year. I d. 
85. See note 84 and accompanying text supra. 
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V. INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 
Governments have entered into international commodity agreements III an 
effort to alleviate chronic commodity market instability.86 The overriding tech-
nical objectives of such agreements are to stabilize prices and insure equitable 
returns to producers.87 The ideal achievement of these objectives would result in 
stabilization of "the market price of the commodity around its long-term trend, 
as determined by the forces of supply and demand," and would avoid excessive 
interference in the market. 88 Generally, national commodity agreements employ 
three types of control measures in order to achieve the desired goals: (1) export 
quotas,89 (2) buffer stocks,90 and (3) multilateral sales contracts,91 the device 
most often utilized by the international wheat agreements. 92 
Motivation to adopt a wheat commodity agreement also arises from the exis-
tence of export-hindering trade barriers.93 Ideally, a commodity agreement 
should liberalize world trade by reducing the need for protective devices such as 
tariffs, subsidies or levies, since the agreement would itself provide access to 
markets and an adequate return to producers. 94 Historically, the realization of 
86. Katz, Department Testifies on International Commodity Agreements, DEP'T ST. BULL. Jul. 1977, at 19 
[hereinafter cited as Department TestifiesJ. 
87. Note, Commodity Agreements, 6 GA. INT'L & COMPo L. 275, 282 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Commodity Agreements J. Many of the commodity agreements, other than the wheat agreements, are vitally 
concerned with securing markets and adequate foreign exchange for developing, primary-commodity 
producing countries. Much of UNCTAD's concern with commodity agreements centers on this objec-
tive. However, wheat, unlike many of the other commodities, is primarily exported by industrialized 
countries, and, thus, this concern is of little importance. !d. 
88. Katz, supra note 56, at 2. 
89. Export quotas, as the name indicates, involve the assignment of export quotas to each producer 
country. Such quotas represent the producer's share of the free market. Since export quotas prevent 
surpluses from reaching the world market, stabilization should result. The International Sugar Agree-
ment of 1958, 10 U.S.T. 2189, T.I.A.S. No. 4389, utilizes this device. See Gariepy, International 
Commodity Agreements, 25 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 677, 680 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Gariepy]. 
90. Buffer stocks operate in the same theoretical manner as a reserve. Stocks are purchased from the 
market when either a supply increase or a demand decrease causes farm prices to fall below a specified 
level. Conversely, when prices rise to a certain specified level, a sign that demand is strong and supplies 
are tight, stocks are released into the market. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 63. 
See also notes 56-66 and accompanying text supra. Buffer stocks have been utilized in both the Tin and 
Cocoa Agreements. 
91. The multilateral contract device is an agreement under which an importing country agrees to buy 
a certain percentage of its total imports from participating exporting countries, and exporting countries 
agree to make available to the importing country a sufficient quantity to satisfy its needs. Stabilization 
results from the fact that a price range is set in the agreement. I f prices rise above the maximum of the 
the specified range, the exporter is, nevertheless, required to sell the specified quantity for no more 
than the maximum price. Conversely, when prices fall below the minimum set forth in the agreement, 
importers are still required to purchase the specified quantity for the minimum price. See Gariepy, supra 
note 89, at 680-8\. 
92. !d. 
93. Fawcett, The Function of Law in International Commodity Agreements, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 157, 159 
(1970). 
94. Conversely, the success of a commodity agreement often hinges on its successful avoidance of 
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the goal of liberalized world trade through international commodity agreements 
has been, and continues to be, heavily influenced by the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 95 GATT was originally a limited agreement on 
tariffs and certain other trade barriers, rather than an all-inclusive commercial 
policy treaty.96 GATT's drafters designed it to stimulate international trade 
through the removal of barriers that interfere with the otherwise normal flow of 
exports and imports.97 Thus, given its original limited conception, GATT, at the 
outset, did not address commodity problems. Rather, Chapter VI of the final 
draft of the International Trade Organization (ITO or "Havana" Charter)98 
contains an "exception clause" for commodity agreements. 911 This "exception 
clause" provides an exception for measures "undertaken in pursuance of 
obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agreement which con-
forms to criteria submitted to the contracting parties and not disapproved by 
them or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved."IOo An Interpretive 
Note101 to this clause, added to the GATT in 1955, provides that the exception 
extends to any commodity agreement which conforms to the principles ap-
proved by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 30 (IV) of 28 March 
1947.102 The resolution referred to by this Interpretive Note called for the 
establishment of an Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Com-
modity Arrangements (ICCICA), which would be charged with the duty of 
facilitating intergovernmental consultation and action regarding commodity 
problems. l03 The resolution also urged that 
restricting the market. See Gerhard, supra note 64, at 290. "In general, the case for control agreements 
will be the stronger the less it relies on protective agreements as such, or the more it relies on a 
maximization of the economic gains from trade." Id. 
95. GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 & A1365, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 V.N.T.S.194 [hereinafter cited 
as GATTj. This treaty is applied through a "Protocol of Provisional Application" (PPA), which became 
effective on january I, 1948. Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 & AI365, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 V.N.T.S. 308. GATT, itself, is not 
applied because parliamentary action would be required in order for several countries to accept many 
general clauses of GATT. Id. 
96. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LA W OF GATT 722 (1969) [hereinafter cited as JACKSONj. 
97. Walker, The International Law of Commodity Agreements, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 392, 393 (1963) 
[hereinafter cited as Walker j. 
98. HAVANA CHARTER, supra note 17, arts. 55-70. 
99. The "exception clause" is now embodied in GATT, supra note 95, art. XX, para. (h). 
100. [d. 
101. [d. annex I, ad. art. XX. 
102. E.S.C. Res. 30,4 V.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. I) at 3, V.N. Doc. E/437 (1947). In light of this 
language, commodity agreements can qualify for the GATT exception in three ways: (I) if they conform 
to the principles of the March 1947 Economic and Social Council Resolution; (2) if the criteria for the 
commodity agreement were agreed upon and submitted to the contracting parties and the agreement 
conformed to those criteria; and (3) if an agreement is submitted (which conceivably could be as 
informal as forwarding copies of the agreement to GATT contracting parties) and the agreement is not 
disapproved. See JACKSON, supra note 96, at 731-32. 
103. JACKSON, supra note 96, at 731-32. 
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members of the United Nations adopt as a general guide in inter-
governmental consultation or action with respect to commodity 
problems the principles laid down in ... the chapter on inter-
governmental commodity arrangements of the draft charter ap-
pended to the report of the first session of the Preparatory Commit-
tee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. 104 
237 
The Interpretative Note ties interpretation of the GATT exception clause to the 
principles of the United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution and, 
thus, the ITO Charter, by reference. l05 
Presently, the GATT formally influences commodity agreements in three 
ways: (1) through a review and consultation procedure involving GATT's own 
committees and ICCICA, the UN commodity committee under the aegis of 
UNESCO;106 (2) through a framework for negotiating and conferring on trade 
matters concerning the commodity trade;107 and (3) through Article XX, sub-
paragraph (h) of the Agreement itself (the "Exception Clause"). This clause 
excepts from general GATT obligations those actions undertaken in commodity 
agreements which are in accordance with the principles embodied in the drafts 
of the ITO Charter. lOB 
The concern expressed in the GATT provisions for international commodity 
agreements arguably allows specific commodities to be singled out for "special 
handling under special rules and arrangements going beyond and departing 
from those governing the generality of goods under GATT,"109 and, thus, is 
104. [d. See HAVANA CHARTER, supra note 17, arts. 55-70. The United States supplied much of the 
initiative for the special meetings and reports devoted to commodity problems. The U.S. initial 
proposals for an ITO charter contained a chapter focusing on this issue, and in addition, called for a 
study of commodity problems and for the convening of a series of intergovernmental conferences to 
frame agreements on the issue. See JACKSON, supra note 9S, at 721. 
105. See JACKSON, supra note 96, at 723. 
106. ICCICA was established by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in its 
resolution of March 28,1947. E.S.C. Res. 30,4 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.1) at 3, U.N. Doc. E/437 (1947). 
In 1964, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution providing that the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCT AD) Board establish a commodities committee that would 
assume the functions of the Commission on International Commodity Trade (CICT) and the ICCICA, 
while maintaining ICCICA as an advisory body of the new committee. G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 15) at 1-5, U.N. Doc. N5815 (1964). For a more complete history of ICCICA, see JACKSON, 
supra note 96, at 724-26. 
107. HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 70. In 1957, the contracting parties to GATT adopted a resolution 
providing, in brief, that they shall: (1) review at every session the trends and developments in interna-
tional commodity trade; (2) take account of problems relating to international commodity trade which 
may be contributing to the disequilibrium of the balance of payments and compelling certain contract-
ing parties to maintain import restrictions; (3) consult on the problems arising out of the trade in the 
primary commodities; and (4) arrange an intergovernmental meeting in conjunction with the United 
Nations and other intergovernmental organizations concerned. This meeting could usefully contribute 
to the solution of commodity trade problems. GATT, 5th Supp. BISD 87 (1957). 
108. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text supra. 
109. Walker, supra note 97, at 394. 
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contradictory to the free trade goals sought under the GA TT.II0 An interna-
tional commodity agreement employing quantitative limits on imports and/or 
exports, specific market shares or other restrictions upon the freedom of import-
ers and exporters, is incompatible with GATT free trade principles. 111 GATT 
was part of a post-World War II effort by world trade partners to restructure 
international trade in order to prevent a recurrence of the "autarkic policies that 
had plagued the 1930's."112 Commodity agreements are arguably not "free 
trade" oriented, but instead they merely substitute the agreements' rigid stan-
dards for a country's autarkic policies. On balance, however, any trade restrict-
ing effects of International Commodity Agreements, with respect to GATT 
objectives, should be outweighed by the benefits resulting from successful opera-
tion of a commodity agreement which stabilized the market and provided ade-
quate producer returns. 113 Yet, a review of the past International Wheat Agree-
ments reveals that, in reality, the negative trade restricting effects have out-
weighed any success that the agreements have fostered. 114 
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT AGREEMENTS 
A. Thr International Wheat Agreements of 1933 
Fluctuations in wheat prices to below pre-World War I levels led to the first 
discussions of international wheat market regulation at conferences in 1927, 
1930 and 1931. 110 Representatives of Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United 
States, and eighteen European countries concluded the first International Wheat 
Agreement at a London conference in August 1933. 116 The International Wheat 
110. fd. 
Ill. fd. 
112. Hudec, GATT or GABB? Thp Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE 
L.]. 1299, 1302 (1971). "Autarky" is defined as "a policy of establishing a national economy that is 
completely self~sufficient and independent of imports from other countries." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 146 (1976). 
113. Walker, supra note 97, at 394. 
114. SfP Metzger, Cartels, Combiru's, Commodity Agreements and International Law, II TEX. INT'L L. J. 527, 
535 (1976). 
fd. 
The difference in the ITO Charter treatment of raw material cartels as compared with those 
for industrial products resulted from the view of the majority of countries that the difficulties 
of a "free market" for primary commodities outweighed its virtues .... The Havana Charter 
reflected. . tolerance [in this area] while simultaneously seeking to mitigate the degree of 
divergence from free trade principles that it connoted. 
115. HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 71. 
116. International Wheat Agreement, Aug. 25, 1933, 141 L.N.T.S. 71,6 Hudson 437 [hereinafter 
cited as International Wheat Agreement]. Much of the impetus for the agreement was provided by U.S. 
Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace. In addition to the International Wheat Agreement, Wallace's 
idea for an "ever normal granary," similar to the biblical account of Joseph storing grain against the 
famine, or the Confucians storing grain in ancient China, or the Mormons storing food, was the first, 
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Agreement of 1933 established export quotas for each signatory country for the 
harvests of 1933 and 1934,117 and also mandated a fifteen percent worldwide 
reduction of wheat acreages to take effect in 1934.IIH Further, the agreement 
contained commitments by thirteen importing countries not to encourage fur-
ther expansion of wheat production within their own territories.ll~ Additionally, 
those importers agreed to reduce their own customs tariffs on wheat when the 
world price of wheat reached the equivalent of 63 cents gold per bushel and had 
remained at that level for sixteen weeksYo The agreement was short-lived, 
however, as a result of the difficulty of enforcing such an agreement, 121 coupled 
with disastrously low world wheat prices. 122 By 1935, the first International Wheat 
Agreement was defunct. 123 
B. The International Wheat Agreement of 1949 
1. Background 
Following World War II, much of the responsibility for supplying a war-
ravaged Europe with wheat and other food fell to the United States and 
Canada. 124 The United States supplied almost one-half of the world's wheat 
needs from 1945 to 1949. 12 :' By 1948, however, a large surplus of grain had built 
up in the midwestern United States. 126 The tenuous nature of many foreign 
economies, coupled with the resumption of domestic production in the wheat-
growing countries prevented expansion of commercial markets as a means of 
using that surplus. 127 The all too familiar cycle of "overproduction - falling 
pricings - falling income" had begun again, fostering renewed international 
interest in attempts to liberalize the global wheat trade. 12H 
and perhaps the most famous of the modern proposals for establishing an international grain reserve. 
HADWIGER, supra note 35. at 28. See generally H. WALLACE, NEW FRONTIERS (1934). 
117. International Wheat Agreement, supra note 116. art. I. 
liS. fd., art. 2. 
119. fd., art. 6(1). 
120. fd., art. 6(1Il), app. A(3). 
121. MORGAN. supra note 84, at 121. For example. in the initial year of the agreement, Argentina, 
lacking adequate storage facilities. exceeded its export quota by one million tons of wheat. Efforts to 
enforce the acreage restrictions also met with failure since cooperation \\'as really the only method of 
enforcement. fd. 
122. Wheeler, supra note 15. at 390. 
123. fd. 
124. MORGAN. supra note 84, at 136. Food was shipped under the auspices of the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (Ul\RRA) and the Marshall Plan. Id. 
125. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the average percentage of total world exports 
from the United States and Canada combined. for the period 1945-1949, was 76%. The individual 
percentages were 47.3% and 2S.77<, respectively. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE, PUB. No. A93.11. WHEAT SITUATION (1963). 
126. MORGAN, supra note S4, at 137. 
127. fd. 
128. HADWIGER. ,Iupra note 35. at 81. 
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2. The Agreement of 1949 
The International Wheat Agreement of 1949129 was a contract between 
specific importers and exporters fixing both the quantities to be purchased and 
the range of prices. 13o Each exporter or importer was to furnish or purchase a 
specific quantity of wheat, reflecting the trade patterns which already existed 
between them. '3' Essentially, the Agreement provided that when prices in the 
international market reached or exceeded the equivalent of $1. 80 for No. 1 
Manitoba Northern wheat,'32 the exporting countries would supply to each of 
the importers their respective allocated quantity at the $1.80 price. 133 When 
prices reached the minimum figure of $1.50 in the first year; $1.20 in the last 
year,134 the importing countries would purchase the total guaranteed quantity at 
that specified minimum price. 135 The International Wheat Agreement covered 
slightly less than one-half of the total world wheat exports of 1948-49.136 The 
total guaranteed sales of the United States under the International Wheat 
Agreement amounted to 37% of the world's total sales. 137 
Two of the most important characteristics of the 1949 International Wheat 
Agreement were the lack of production controls and the flexible price range 
provided under the agreement. 138 The maximum price of $1.80 a bushel and 
129. International Wheat Agreement of 1949, 63 Stat. 2173, T.I.A.S. No. 1957, 203 U.N.T.S. 179 
[hereinafter cited as International Wheat Agreement 1949]. 
130. HElD, supra note 21, at 89. Except for Argentina and the Communist countries, all major 
exporters and 37 of the significant importing countries signed the International Wheat Agreement. See 
HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 72. 
131. International Wheat Agreement 1949, supra note 129. 
132. Under the price schedule set forth in the International Wheat Agreement 1949, a price was 
determined for one type of wheat, the Canadian Manitoba No. I (the top quality wheat in the world) at 
the Lakehead parts. Id. art. VI. All other types of wheat were priced with reference to this one pegged 
wheat. !d. The Price Equivalence Committee of the International Wheat Council of London met 
periodically to determine the relationship between the pegged wheat and the others. Id. See International 
Wheat Agreement, 1971: Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on International Wheat Agreement of the Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15 (1971). 
133. International Wheat Agreement 1949, supra note 129, art. III(3)(b). 
134. 1d. art. VI (this article sets forth minimum and maximum prices). 
135. Id. art. III(3)(a). The International Wheat Agreement went into effect on August I, 1949 for a 
period of four years. 
136. HElD, supra note 21, at 89. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. Johnson, Agricultural Price Policy and International Trade, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FI-
NANCE 7 (Jun. 1954). The lack of production controls in the International Wheat Agreement of 1949 is 
somewhat surprising since harvested acres in the United States reached an all-time high in 1949 of 
almost 76 million acres (84 million acres planted) and carryover stocks were mounting. Id. 
A general over-all view of the price support and related activities from 1933 to the present 
would note the following points. During the last twenty-one years, attempts to regulate 
production (if one excludes tobacco) were made in only eight years. Most agricultural econo-
mists would agree that the methods used to limit output have been relatively ineffective, having 
been accompanied by positive incentives to increase production. Not only were price supports 
maintained at relatively profitable levels and direct payments made to producers, but many of 
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the provision for a descending price minimum, beginning at $1.50, reflected the 
importers' expectations that prices would drop to the pre-World War II levels. 139 
In the long run, the 1949 Agreement was a boon to the importing countries, 
since world market prices outside the Agreement remained substantially higher 
than the maximum Agreement price, and exporters were bound by the agree-
ment to supply the fixed quantities to importers at the $1.80 maximum price. 140 
3. Extensions to the Agreement of 1949 
The parties to the International Wheat Agreement of 1949 revised and re-
newed the Agreement in 1953,141 1956,142 1959,143 and in 1962.144 In 1965 and 
1966, the parties extended the Agreement for one-year periods by protocol 
agreements145 in order that renegotiation of the Wheat Agreement could reflect 
the understandings arrived at during the sixth round of multilateral trade 
negotiations conducted under the auspices of the GA TT. 146 The parties to 
the Agreement allowed the substantive provisions of the International Wheat 
Agreement to expire on July 31, 1967. The parties extended the administrative 
provisions until July 31,1968147 so that the Agreement reached on a new wheat 
price schedule during the Kennedy Round could be incorporated into the 
International Grains Arrangement148 negotiated during the fall of 1967.149 
Aside from the slight increases and reductions made to the maximum price, 
the most significant change under the 1949 International Wheat Agreement, or 
its extensions, occurred in the International Wheat Agreement of 1959,150 which 
[d. 
the activities associated with the farm programs have been effective means of increasing output 
by inducing or aiding farmers to adopt improved production techniques. 
139. HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 72. 
140. Wheeler, supra note 15, at 372. 
141. The International Wheat Agreement of 1953, 4 V.S.T. 944, T.l.A.S. No. 2799, 203 V.N.T.S. 
179. 
142. The International Wheat Agreement of 1956, 7 V.S.T. 3275, T.I.A.S. No. 3709,270 V.N.T.S. 
103. 
143. The International Wheat Agreement of 1959,10 V.S.T. 1477, T.I.A.S. No. 4302, 349 V.N.T.S. 
167 [hereinafter cited as International Wheat Agreement 1959]. 
144. The International Wheat Agreement 1962, 13 V.S.T. 1571, T.l.A.S. No. 5115, 444 V.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter cited as International Wheat Agreement 1962]. 
145. Multilateral Extension of International Wheat Agreement, 1962, 16 V.S.T. 1010, T.l.A.S. No. 
5844,544 V.N.T.S. 350; Multilateral Further Extension of International Wheat Agreement, 1962, 17 
V.S.T. 948, T.l.A.S. No. 657, 723 V.N.T.S. 346. 
146. JACKSON, supra note 96, at 729. Conducted from 1962-1967, these negotiations are referred to 
commonly as the "Kennedy Round." 
147. Multilateral Further Extension of International Wheat Agreement, 1962, 18 V.S.T. 1699, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6315, 723 V.N.T.S. 372. 
148. International Grains Arrangement, June 30, 1967, 19 V.S.T. 5499, T.I.A.S. No. 6537, 727 
V.N.T.S.3. 
149. JACKSON, supra note 96, at 729. 
150. International Wheat Agreement 1959, supra note 143. 
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expressed each importing country's quota for wheat as a percentage of the 
country's total wheat imports rather than in absolute terms, as had previously 
been done. 151 This change reduced the effectiveness of the International Wheat 
Agreement, since exporters were no longer guaranteed specific quantities of 
wheat sales, nor a percentage of the total sales under the International Wheat 
Agreement. 152 The lack of definite quotas or percentages allowed importers to 
use substitutes for imported wheat, or to increase their self-sufficiency in pro-
duction. 153 Reduced certainty in both production and price resulted as loopholes 
in the pricing developed.154 Thus, the International Wheat Agreement price 
range more closely represented the pricing policies of Canada, the price leader, 
and the United States, rather than a price standard. 155 In the 1962 International 
Wheat Agreement, a new provision stated that nothing in the Agreement should 
"prejudice the complete liberty of action of any exporting or importing country 
in the determination and administration of its internal agricultural and price 
policies."156 Expressing the problems with such a provision, Leslie Wheeler, a 
negotiator of the International Wheat Agreement stated: "[I]f this clause cannot 
be dropped and something substituted to the effect that national agricultural 
[wheat] policies will be operated in such a way as to contribute to the implemen-
151. Id. art. 4(1)-(2). The exporters agreed to supply the average "commercial" purchases of the 
individual importing countries within the price range of $1.50 to $1.90 a bushel during a specified 
period, see id. art. 14, while the importers agreed to purchase, within the price range, specified 
percentages of their commercial wheat import requirements. /d. 
152. HElD, supra note 21, at 91. 
153. Malmgren & Schlechty, supra note I, at 536. 
154.Id. 
155. Id. at 91. See aL50 HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 73-74. 
Indeed, the IWA had proven the point of those who had long ago argued that no international 
commodity agreement could determine prices. For a long time some pessimists had stressed 
the technical difficulty of establishing price relationships between differing qualities of wheat. 
Under the IWA an effort had been made to relate major wheat prices to the stated price for a 
particular kind and location of wheat. ... Kinds and locations of wheat could be related on a 
scale, but quality differences had provided a major loophole for evading the IWA price range. 
While the IWA could not adequately regulate prices, neither could it prevent exporters from 
managing prices in their own behalf. One of Britain's reasons for quitting IWA in the 1950s 
was that agreement could not insure free movement of prices within the established range, nor 
could it prevent price collaboration between the United States and Canada or take steps to 
prevent a very effective duopoly of world prices. 
Id. But see Farnsworth, International Wheat Agreements and Problems, 1949-56, 70 Q.J. ECON. 217, 233 
(1956). This author states: 
Id. 
One of the disadvantages of an international commodity agreement molded in the form of a 
multilateral contract is the difficulty of accurately forseeing future price trends and ensuring 
that the negotiated price range is realistic. This has been a persistent problem in the case of 
wheat. The first International Wheat Agreement effective from 1949-1953 operated solely to 
the benefit of imporring countries, for world prices were consistently above the stipulated 
maximum. 
156. International Wheat Agreement 1962, supra note 144, art. 23(3). 
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tation of the International Wheat Agreement, there IS senous doubt as to the 
value of such an agreement."157 
4. Dispute Resolution 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the various International Wheat Agree-
ments or their extensions, the willingness of France and Australia to sub-
mit their 1958 wheat trade dispute to a GATT panel for resolution evidenced 
confidence that the world wheat trade could still be equitably governed. 15B 
Australia complained that France was responsible for the illegal undercutting of 
Australia's traditional Asian wheat markets through French use of export sub-
sidies, which is prohibited under Article XVI of GA TT.159 Article XVI allows the 
use of subsidies for the limited purpose of, or to the extent necessary to main-
tain, an "equitable share" of the market. 160 The Panel found, on the basis of the 
statistics submitted, that the French subsidies did violate Article XVI, since it was 
clear that French supplies had in fact displaced Australian supplies to a large 
extent in the three Southeast Asian markets. 161 The Panel recommended that 
France revise its practices in the financing of wheat exports to Southeast Asia so 
as not to adversely effect Australian markets. 162 It further recommended that 
the two countries consult before the French exporters entered into new con-
tracts. 163 Aside from this successful example, however, such an orderly resolu-
tion of wheat trade disputes proved to be the exception rather than the rule. 164 
Countries could adopt export subsidies or other devices in order to protect their 
"equitable share" of the market, and countries viewed such unilateral actions as 
more easily undertaken than going through the dispute procedure. 165 
157. Wheeler, supra note 15, at 396. 
158. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, Report on the Australia-France Wheat Trade Dispute, GATT, 
7th Supp. BISD 46 (GATT Doc. Ll924 (1958» [hereinafter cited as GATT Report]. The claim is also 
discussed in R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPWMACY 89 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as HUDEC]. Parts of the claim are also reprinted in J. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 757-62 (1977). 
159. GATT Report, supra note 158, at 46. 
160. GATT, supra note 95, art. XVI. The issue as framed by the GATT panel was "[w]hether and to 
what extent the operation of subsidies granted by France on the export of wheat and wheat flour had 
caused injury to Australia's normal commercial interests, and whether such an injury represented an 
impairment of benefits accruing to Australia under the General Agreement." Id. 
161. GATT Report, supra note 158. 
162.Id. 
163. Id. France and Australia were eventually able to agree upon an export price arrangement that 
was acceptable. See HUDEC, supra note 158, at 89. 
164. Schram, supra note 6, at 281. Australia, however, did file a similar charge against Italy involving a 
subsidy violation. This dispute was also referred to the dispute panel and was resolved on the basis of 
revision of the subsidy program. See HUDEC, supra note 158, at 89. 
165. See Graham, Reforming the International Trading System: The Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations in the 
Final Stage, 12 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1,34-35 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Graham]. Graham points out that 
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VII. THE INTERNATIONAL GRAINS AGREEMENT 
A. Background 
The general post-war political optimism in the ability of GATT and the 
International Wheat Agreement to solve world agricultural problems was di-
minished, if not altogether dissipated, by the events of the 1960's.166 Problems 
not envisioned in 1949, such as the establishment of the trade restrictive Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Economic Community (EEC);167 
the impact of diverse domestic farm support and production policies;168 the 
widening gap in trade growth rates between the developing and the developed 
countries;169 and the growing need for wheat in the developing countries170 put 
enormous additional pressures on the two strained agreements. 
Central to the breakdown in wheat regulation was the change in the relation-
ship of the two largest wheat exporters, Canada and the United States, from 
not only is the obligation not to subsidize agricultural exports precatory as opposed to mandatory, but 
the "equitable share" concept is so imprecise as to amount to "little more than an exhortation." Id. 
166. See HUDEC, supra note 158, at 200. 
167. The European Economic Community (EEC) was established by The Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Communities, 295 V.N.T.S. 2 (German). The official English version is reprinted in 
[1973] GR. BRIT. T.S. No.1 (CMD. 2, No. 5179) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. The Common 
Agricultural Policy itself is to be found in the regulations, directives and decisions published in the 
Official Journal of the Community. The EEC (consisting of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland and the Vnited Kingdom) established the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP) in 1962 in order to insure fair price levels to farmers within the EEC while at the same 
time assuring consumers adequate supplies at reasonable prices. The heart of the EEC's grain regula-
tion is the "variable import levy," which automatically separates domestic prices from foreign prices. A 
domestic target price is determined, and the tariff is defined to be whatever variable amount is 
necessary to achieve the domestic target. The change in the tariff compensates for any change in the 
import price and the import demand for grain is thereby rendered inelastic. Through this system, the 
price of grains within the EEC are maintained at levels approximately twice as high as world market 
prices, with a corresponding adverse effect on producer returns in the major exporting countries. See 
T. GRENNES, P. JOHNSON & M. THURSBY, THE ECONOMICS OF WORLD GRAIN TRADE (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as GRENNES, JOHNSON & THURSBY]; GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEMS, supra note 77, at 50; FLANIGAN 
REPORT, supra note 28. For a good review of CAP policy generally, see Riesenfeld, Common Market for 
Agricultural Products and Common Agricultural Policy in the European Economic Community, 1965 V. ILL. L. F. 
658· Dam, The European Common Market in Agriculture, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (1967). 
168. See, e.g., GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEMS, supra note 77, for a detailed description of the different 
domestic policies embraced by the major exporters. 
The implementation of government policies can both augment and attenuate instability in 
national and international markets .... [A]ction to provide a greater degree of market stability 
can run counter to other policy goals and, like other policy action, can add to instability rather 
than reduce it. Moreover, ... various measures taken for strictly domestic or interior motives, 
can result in an international situation that is less stable. 
DECD, supra note 2, at 48. 
169. Note, U.S. Commodities Policy: A Suggested Modification of the Proposalfor an International Resources 
Bank, 17 VA. j. INT'L L. 279, 287 (1977). "From 1950 to 1960 the growth rate for developed nations was 
2.8%. compared to 2.4% for developing nations. During the 1960s the annual average growth rates for 
developed and developing countries were 4.1% and 2.6% respectively." Id. 
170. DISINCENTIVES. supra note 10. at 30. 
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cooperation to competitiveness. l7l In 1964, U.S. cash exports had declined to 
their lowest post-war level,172 but other exporters, especially Canada, had in-
creased their export sales with the opening of giant new export markets in the 
Communist countries. 173 Because of the Cold War, these markets were not open 
to the United States. Therefore, in the face of growing American wheat 
surpluses, the United States adopted an aggressive price-cutting policy in order 
to regain a "traditional" market, Japan. 174 The Japanese market, originally 
developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service 
(FAS),175 was partially lost when Japan turned to Canada for higher quality 
wheat. 176 The undercutting policy was successful, and by 1965, America had 
recaptured the Japanese wheat market. 177 
The United States also felt that it had assumed a disproportionately large 
share of the responsibility for both world supply controls178 and food aid re-
quirements in developing countries. 179 Lower world prices, encouraged by the 
171. HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 77. 
172. [d. The U.S. fair share of cash exports had been estimated to be 250 million bushels, but it had 
dropped to 161 million bushels in 1964. [d. 
173. FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC REpORT No. 75, WORLD 
DEMAND PROSPECTS FOR GRAIN IN 19805 (1971). Canada supplied 57% of USSR imports in 1964-1966, 
20% of Eastern Europe's imports in 1964-1966, and together with Australia and Argentina supplied 
Communist China (chiefly Mainland China) with 5.8 million tons of wheat. [d. 
174. See HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 77. 
175. The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) was created by Executive Order of President 
Eisenhower in 1954. Exec. Order No. 10,560, 19 Fed. Reg. 5927 (1954). FAS is the export promotion 
and service agency for the USDA. It was created to stimulate overseas markets for U.S. agricultural 
products. [d. 
176. HADWIGER, supra note 35, at 5. The United States accounted for 52% of the Japanese imports, 
36% of the Canadians', and 12% of the Australians'. [d. 
177. [d. at 77. 
178. [d. at 82. The United States was the only major exporting country to have a production control 
program in effect, albeit a voluntary program. Under the Agriculture Act of 1964 (see note 45 supra), 
farmers had only to comply with assigned allotments to be eligible for price supports, and farmers who 
diverted a specified acreage to conservation uses were eligible for income supplements as well as 
"marketing certificates" - certificates of compliance with the wheat diversion program which could be 
redeemed for a certain amount of money. [d. The value of the certificates was 70 to 75 cents a bushel, 
and by 1970, the cost of the program amounted to $100 million. The program was highly successful, 
however, and by 1966, U.S. stocks were reduced to 535 million bushels from 1,195 million bushels in 
1963-1964. See GRAIN RESERVES, supra note 4, at 2. 
In addition, starting in 1955, the United States restricted the amount of acreage that could be planted 
to wheat. See National Wheat Acreage Allotment Program, 7 U.S.C. § 1333 (1955 & Supp. V 1970). From 
1955 through 1963, the national acreage allotment was 55 million acres. This figure fell to 47.8 million 
acres in 1966, rose to 68.2 million acres in 1967, and then fell steadily to 45.5 million acres in 1970. 
179. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL POllCY IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 29 (1976) [hereinafter cited as U.S. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY] (quoting ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE WORLD FOOD SITUATION AND PROSPECTS TO 198554 
(1974». According to this publication, "[b]etween 1965 and 1973, nearly $11 billion worth of food aid 
was provided worldwide, with the U.S. accounting for 80 percent of the total." [d. A footnote to this 
statement further provides: "This figure overstates the U.S. contribution to the extent most U.S. aid 
took the form of concessional sales while aid from most other countries was in the form of outright 
grants." [d. at 54 n.13. 
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U.S. price cutting action, led to a decline in world production of wheat. I80 The 
lower prices and lower production allowed the United States to substantially 
decrease its wheat surpluses. 181 Unfortunately, the reduction in surpluses had 
the negative effect of reducing the food aid to developing countries, a pattern 
that later repeated itself in the aftermath of the giant Russian grain sales in 
1972. 182 This development highlighted the need for greater sharing of aid 
commitments among donor countries as well as a modification or restructuring 
of the food aid program so that donee countries would not have to assume the 
burden of market shifts through a reduction in their aid.183 
B. The International Grains Arrangement of 1968 
The International Grains Arrangement (IGA)184 represented an attempt at 
joint regulation and control of the world wheat market that was extraordinarily 
ambitious in scope. The International Grains Arrangement was composed of two 
conventions: the Wheat Trade Convention (WTC),185 covering the commercial 
wheat market transactions, and the Food Aid Convention (FAC),186 containing 
agreements for minimum annual commitments of food aid to developing coun-
tries by donor countries. 187 The Wheat Trade Convention was essentially a 
multilateral contract between importing and exporting countries.188 The import-
ers agreed to purchase from member countries "the maximum possible share of 
its total commercial purchases' of wheat in any crop year" and "not less than a 
percentage established by the [International Wheat 1 Council in agreement with 
the importing country concerned."189 In return, the exporters agreed to supply 
wheat to importing countries "at prices consistent with the price range in quan-
tities sufficient to satisfy on a regular and continuous basis the commercial 
180. World wheat production amounted to 264 million metric tons in 1965, a decrease of 11 million 
metric tons from 1964. HElD, supra note 21, at 83. 
181. Id. at 91. By 1966, V.S. stocks were reduced to 535 million bushels from 1,195 million in 
1963-1964. See note 178 and accompanying text supra. 
182. HElD, supra note 21, at 91. The same trend was observed in 1972 after the Russian wheat sales of 
that year. See GRAIN RESERVES, supra note 4, at 16. 
183. TREZISE, supra note 56, at 21-26. 
184. The International Grains Arrangement, June 30, 1967, 19 V.S.T. 5499, T.I.A.S. No. 6537, 727 
V.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as International Grains Arrangement]. 
185. Wheat Trade Convention, June 30,1967,19 V.S.T. 5504, T.I.A.S. No. 6537, 727 V.N.T.S. 8 
[hereinafter cited as Wheat Trade Convention]. 
186. Food Aid Convention, June 30, 1967, 19 V.S.T. 5772, T.I.A.S. No. 6537, 727 V.N.T.S. 198 
[hereinafter cited as Food Aid Convention]. 
187. Id. 
188. Schram, supra note 6, at 299. 
189. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184. Wheat Trade Convention, supra note 185, 
art. 4, para. 2. See also Wassermann,lnteT'fUltional Wheat Agreement 1971, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 360, 361 
(1971) [hereinafter cited as International Wheat Agreement 197/]. 
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requirements of those countries."190 In contrast to the International Wheat 
Agreements, which set a minimum and maximum price range based on one 
reference wheat,191 the International Grains Arrangement established price 
ranges on each of fourteen major wheats. 192 The Arrangement also established a 
Prices Review Committee,193 composed of representatives of five exporting 
countries, five importing countries, the EEC and two additional members.194 
The Arrangement called for the Committee to be convened within two days of a 
determination by the Secretariat of the International Wheat Council "that a 
situation has arisen, or threatens imminently to arise, which appears to jeopar-
dize the objectives of this Convention with regard to the minimum price provi-
sions."195 If the Committee could not agree on "action to be taken to restore 
market stability"196 after three market days, the Arrangement required the Wheat 
Council to be convened within two days of the Committee's last meeting "to 
consider what further measures might be taken."197 If, after three days of review 
by the Council, sales of wheat below the minimum price did not cease, the 
Arrangement called for the Council to decide "whether provisions of this Con-
vention [should] be suspended, and if so, to what extent."198 This procedural 
review was designed to provide stability and flexibility in the event of sub-
minimum sales. 199 
The Food Aid Convention200 established a sharing of responsibility for food 
aid, thus taking some of the burden off the United States. 201 Exporting countries 
190. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184; Wheat Trade Convention, supra note 185, 
art. 4, para. 3. 
191. See note 138 and accompanying text supra. 
192. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184; Wheat Trade Convention, supra note 185, 
art. 6. 
193. Id. art. 31, para. I. 
194. Id. 
195. /d. art. 8, para. I. 
196. Id. art. 8, para. 3. 
197.ld. 
198.ld. 
199. Stelnternational Grains Arrangement 1967, 2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 233, 236 (1968) [hereinafter cited 
as International Grains Arrangement 1967]. Since the Prices Review Committee was endowed with the 
power to adjust the differentials as the market required and it also had the power to make rapid 
decisions (with the help of the Subcommittee on Prices, which was charged with the obligation of 
keeping in close touch with the Secretariat of the International Wheat Council and keeping market 
prices under continuous review), no market disturbances should have reached the point of threatening 
the overall stability of the market. /d. 
200. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184; Food Aid Convention, supra note 186. 
201. M. WALLERSTEIN, FOOD FOR WAR - FOOD FOR PEACE 112-13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WAL-
LERSTEIN]. The United States actually demanded the sharing of this responsibility during the Interna-
tional Grains Arrangement negotiations at the Kennedy Round of talks. Sre note 206 and accompanying 
text infra. The United States took the position that its participation in any grains arrangement was 
conditioned on inclusion of food aid provisions in the agreement. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 201, at 
112-13. 
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and industrialized importing countries agreed to provide 4.5 million metric tons 
of grain to developing countries for a three-year period.202 The United States, 
Canada and the countries of the EEC accounted for 76% of the $4.5 million total 
food aid pledged.203 The Convention established a Food Aid Committee com-
prised of the members of the Food Aid Convention. 204 This Committee had the 
responsibility of receiving regular reports and supervising the purchase of grains 
financed by cash contributions.205 
Parties to the GATT Kennedy Round206 considered the International Grains 
Arrangement, thus, a symbolic, if not actual, link to GATT principles.207 The 
Arrangement's connection to GATT free trade principles,20B its multilateral 
contract responsibilities,209 its price review procedures,21o and finally, its joint 
food aid obligations under the Food Aid Convention211 represent an effort to 
cover all eventualities and establish a viable framework for cooperation among 
the countries involved.212 
C. The Breakdown of the International Grains Arrangement 
It is easier to give factual description of the events surrounding the failure of 
the International Grains Arrangement than it is to offer a clear and full explana-
tion of the reasons for that failure. Essentially, almost immediately after the 
Agreement took effect, the minimum prices of the Agreement collapsed under 
intense pressure.213 The International Grains Arrangement price range for 
wheat increased the price per bushel about twenty cents over the price range 
contained in the 1962 agreement.214 However, the Arrangement failed to pro-
202. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184; Food Aid Convention, supra note 186, art. 
II. This donation could take the form of wheat, coarse grains suitable for human consumption, or cash 
for the purchase of grain. If cash was contributed, then not less than twenty-five percent of such 
contribution or such part as required to purchase 200,000 metric tons of grain, was required to be used 
to purchase grain in developing countries. See id. art. II( 4)(b). 
203. Food Aid Convention, supra note 186, art. II(2). The United States' share was 42%, the 
Canadian share was II %, and the EC's share was 23%. Id. 
204. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184; Food Aid Convention, supra note 186. 
205. Food Aid Convention, supra note 186, art. III. See also International Grains Arrangement 1967, 
supra note 199, at 238-39. 
206. The "Kennedy Round" is the name given to the sixth round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(MTN) conducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Geneva from 
1964-1967. 
207. JACKSON, supra note 96, at 729. 
208. Id. 
209. Schram, supra note 6, at 299. 
210. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184; Wheat Trade Convention, supra note 185, 
art. 31, para. I. 
211. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184; Food Aid Convention,supra note 186, art. II. 
212. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184; Wheat Trade Convention, supra note 185, 
art. I. 
213. Note, International Commodity Agreements, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 275, 297 (1976). 
214. See International Wheat Agreement 1971, supra note 189, at 361. 
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vide increased access to markets, and thus the price increase caused a relative 
drop in the demand for wheat.215 As a result, exporters were left with a surplus 
of unsold wheat in the face of the Arrangement's minimum price floor.216 In 
addition to this unsold wheat, large national carryover surpluses, which existed 
at the time of the agreement, further contributed to the erosion of the price 
schedule.217 
Despite the apparent thoroughness of the International Grains Arrange-
ment,218 the Arrangement lacked a very fundamental characteristic, which 
proved fatal to its success: the provision for production adjustments. 219 Until 
1970, the United States was the only major exporting country with national 
legislation requiring production contro1.220 The lack of such controls by other 
governments exacerbated the difficulties encountered under the International 
Grains Arrangement because the minimum price set under Arrangement was 
excessive in light of the market surplus. 221 Moreover, the language of the 
International Grains Arrangement led some major exporting countries, notably 
the United States, to believe that cutting prices below the specified minimum did 
not violate the Arrangement.222 By the summer of 1969, barely a year after the 
International Grains Arrangement became effective, the minimum prices re-
mained only technically in effect because the major exporting countries ignored 
their existence.223 Though the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, 
referred to the International Grains Arrangement difficulty in September of 
215.ld. 
216.ld. 
217. Schram, supra note 6, at 311. Schram reports that at the start of 1969, the main exporting 
countries had carryover stocks of 3.2 billion bushels - more than twice the amount of wheat exported 
in world trade in any single year. /d. 
218. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184; Wheat Trade Convention, supra note 185, 
art. I. 
219. See International Grains Arrangement of 1967: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1968) [hereinafter cited as International Grains Arrangement: Hearings]. In a 
statement to the Committee, Dr. D. Gale Johnson said: 
The International Grains Arrangement makes no significant contribution to the fundamental 
problem facing wheat producers. The fundamental problem is that the capacity to produce 
w heat in the developed countries is greater than the capacity of commercial markets to absorb 
the wheat at prices that will provide acceptable incomes for the present number of farmers. 
. . . Governmental policies have been largely responsible for the length of time that the 
imbalance has persisted. Several governments have encouraged high cost production of wheat. 
/d. 
220. See note 45 and accompanying text supra. 
221. Schram, supra note 6, at 312. 
222. Id. at 304-305. "[T]he Convention does not preclude an exporting country from pricing below 
the schedule of minimum prices." International Grains Arrangement: Hearings, supra note 219, at 24. The 
United States adopted the view that the price schedule (Art. 8) was only a guideline which was not 
binding upon exporters. The precatory language of article 8 lends support, unintentionally, to this 
view. /d. 
223. Malmgren & Schlechty, supra note I, at 536. See Schram,supra note 6, at 306-11, for a detailed 
account of the actual price war which occurred. 
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1968 as "teething troubles,"224 by April of 1969, wheat export officials agreed 
privately that all parties had violated the Wheat Trade Convention by selling 
wheat below the specified minimum prices.225 
With this background, no expert was surprised that neither the International 
Grains Arrangement review procedures,226 nor the symbolic connection to 
GATT,227 managed to salvage the Arrangement. Although the review proce-
dures in the Arrangement were comprehensive, they proved to be only as useful 
as the parties themselves made them. Aside from the one review, by the Prices 
Review Committee in October, 1968, of agreements worked out a month earlier 
between several of the exporters, the elaborate review procedures went unused 
and ignored.228 Further, considering the United States' view that the Article 8 
minimum prices were only guidelines,229 the review procedures probably could 
not have had any significant impact in saving the Arrangement. 23o 
More significant than the ineffectiveness of the price review procedures was 
the failure of the GATT - IGA link231 to bolster and save the Arrangement. 
Although one of the stated objectives of the Arrangement, in keeping with 
GATT principles232 was "to promote the expansion of the international trade in 
wheat and wheat flour and to secure the freest possible flow of this trade in the 
interest of both exporting and importing countries,"233 several of the Arrange-
ment's provisions contradicted, in spirit and fact, this stated objective. 234 For 
example, the Arrangement determined the amounts of wheat an exporter was 
required to make available and an importer was entitled to purchase on the basis 
of "datum quantities."235 These quantities reflected the "average annual com-
mercial purchases during the first four of the immediately preceding five crop 
224. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1968, at 69, col. I. 
225. N.Y. Times, April 4,1969, at 47, col. 6. 
226. See notes 193-197 and accompanying text supra. 
227. See note 207 and accompanying text supra. 
228. Schram, supra note 6, at 307. Schram notes that: 
[o]nly ten days are allowed to reach an acceptable solution to the problems that have led to the 
crisis. It is unrealistic to expect that a new price range can be agreed upon in a short time when 
the price range embodied in the agreement has been hammered out in delicate negotiations 
over a long period. 
ld. at 304. 
229. See note 222 and accompanying text supra. 
230. See note 228 and accompanying text supra. Given the national self-interest inherent in agricul-
tural production and trade, in a major exporter's view, such as the United States', the pricing provisions 
are merely guidelines which rise to the level of neither international obligation nor sanction, and this 
certainly impairs, if not destroys, the effectiveness of such an agreement. ld. 
231. See note 207 and accompanying text supra. 
232. Walker, supra note 97, at 393. 
233. International Grains Agreement, supra note 184; Wheat Trade Convention, supra note 185, art. 
I(b). 
234. Schram, supra note 6, at 301. 
235. International Grains Arrangement, supra note 184; Wheat Trade Convention, supra note 185, 
art. 2, para. I. 
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years."236 Rather than expanding trade, these provisions restricted trade to past 
levels. 237 Prior breakdowns of GATT's effectiveness in other agricultural trade 
areas, such as United States' waiver from GATT obligations in the dairy import 
quotas dispute238 or the ongoing ideological battle between GATT free trade 
policies, and EC's239 protectionist CAP also may have diminished GATT's use-
fulness with respect to the Arrangement. 24o Thus, in addition to the GATT 
connection's failure to preserve the Arrangement, confidence and reliance in the 
GATT, at least in the agricultural area, decreased during this time period. 
The failure of the International Grains Arrangement may also have been the 
result of the selfishness of the parties involved.241 Exporters viewed the burden 
of large surpluses coupled with the Arrangement's minimum price floor as a 
threat to their economic well-being. 242 Though wheat demand is relatively price 
inelastic,243 exporters could not sell the surplus grain at the high minimum 
price.244 If selfishness underlies this state of affairs, then the future success of 
international commodity agreements is also likely to be threatened unless parties 
to these agreements develop a broader perception of domestic self-interest in 
terms of agricultural trade. 245 
VIII. THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT AGREEMENT OF 1971 
A. Background and Goals Underlying the Agreement of 1971 
Partly in response to the surplus situation existing in 1968-1969, and partly as 
a result of the lack of national or treaty production controls, Canada and 
Australia instituted production controls to reduce their stocks and raise the price 
236. Wheat Trade Convention, supra note 185, art. 15, para. I. 
237. Note, The 1967 International Grains Arrangement, 2 N.V.V. INT'L L. & POL. 132 (1969) [hereinafter 
cited as Note]. See Schram, supra note 6, at 301. With respect to GATT, Schram also questions the 
wisdom of International Grains Arrangement, Wheat Trade Convention, art. 23, para. 4, which permits 
"the complete liberty of action of any member country in the determination and administration of its 
internal agricultural and price policies," and the authorization under the Wheat Trade Convention (art. 
16, para. 6) for a customs union, such as the EEC, on intraunion sales, to support the price of wheat 
above the maximum outlined in the International Grains Arrangement. [d. 
238. This 1955 dispute over dairy import quotas is discussed in HUDEC, supra note Ill, at 200. 
239. [d. 
240. [d. 
241. Note, supra note 237, at 157. "If the Wheat Agreement has failed, it is not the fault of the 
Agreement but the selfishness of the parties." [d. 
242. Schram, supra note 6, at 317. See also notes 214-27 and accompanying text supra. 
243. HElD, supra note 21, at 43. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra. 
244. Schram, supra note 6, at 312. 
245. G. GoODWIN & J. MAYALL, A NEW INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY REGIME 77, 83 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as GoODWIN & MA YALL]. Varying national objectives and policies can result, in Gilmore's words, 
in a "go-it-alone" policy, much as that which existed in 1968 leading to the break-up of the International 
Grains Arrangement." [d. at 83. 
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of wheat.246 Though the International Grains Arrangement remained in effect 
until 1971, the only operative provision remaining was the Food Aid Conven-
tion. 247 Although some provisions under the Food Aid Convention were less 
than desirable,248 the parties to the Convention, for the most part, considered the 
Convention successful. 249 
The parties to the International Wheat Agreement of 1971 250 continued the 
IGA format of two conventions, and adopted the Food Aid Convention without 
any major changes; but the parties attempted to reconstitute the Wheat Trade 
Convention in the style of the original 1949 International Wheat Agreement. 251 
The new Wheat Trade Convention, however, reflected the 1949 International 
Wheat Agreement in form, only.252 In light of the failure of the rigid price 
schedule under the International Grains Arrangement, the United States253 
sought a more flexible agreement modeled on the earlier 1949 International 
246. HElD, supra note 21, at 67. 
Canada instituted two new programs in 1970: LIFT (Lower Inventory for Tomorrow), a 
special I-year program, and the Wheat Inventory Reduction program. World carryover de-
creased from 1.01 billion bushels (27.5 million metric tons) at the end of 1969 to 365 million 
bushels (9.9 million metric tons) at the end of 1972. Australia implemented delivery quotas in 
1969. Farmers were guaranteed a price only on the quantity sold. Australia's wheat carryover 
dropped from 265 million bushels (7.2 million metric tons) at the end of 1969 to 26 million 
bushels (708 thousand metric tons) at the end of 1972. 
Id. Of course, it must be noted that 1972 was a year of extreme world shortfall of production, due 
primarily to the poor harvest in the VSSR and the failure of the Peruvian anchovy catch (an ingredient 
of high protein feed grain). !d. 
247. Food Aid Convention, supra note 186. 
248. For example, Article II(5) of The Food Aid Convention provided that a country could specify 
the recipient of its contribution, thus allowing politics to enter into the distribution of food aid. Food Aid 
Convention, supra note 186, art. II(5). In addition, under Article II(4)(b), a country could satisfy its food 
aid obligation by cash grant as opposed to food, an unsatisfactory state of affairs since it is not certain 
that the money will be earmarked for food nor will the food reach the people most in need ofit.Id. art. 
4(b). Moreover, the Food Aid Convention has been criticized because a large part of its food aid does 
not represent any addition to existing contributions. See J. WILLETT, THE WORLD FOOD SITUATION 69 
(1976). 
249. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 201, at 112-115. One benefit of the Food Aid Convention noted by 
Wallerstein is: 
In view of the continuing reluctance of many of the largest donors to contribute a larger 
portion of their available food aid resources for outright multilateral distribution via the World 
Food Program, an internationally agreed upon volume commitment from each donor offers a 
viable alternative for reaching some - although certainly not all - of the same objectives. 
Id. at 115. 
250. International Wheat Agreement of 1971, 22 V.S.T. 820, 971, T.I.A.S. No. 7144,800 V.N.T.S. 
45 [hereinafter cited as International Wheat Agreement of 1971]. 
251. International Wheat Agreement 1949, supra note 129. 
252. Without any substantive pricing mechanism, as existed in the International Wheat Agreement 
of 1949, the agreement was unenforceable. See The International Wheat Agreement: Hearings, supra note 31, 
at 24 (referring to the 1980 extension of the International Wheat Agreement of 1971 as a "toothless 
arrangement"). 
253. International Wheat Agreement, 1971: Hearings on Executive F Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on 
International Wheat Agreement of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Executive F] (statement of Mr. Worthington). 
1982] INTERNATIONAL WHEAT TRADE 253 
Wheat Agreement. In the 1949 Agreement, the price of one grain of wheat, the 
Canadian Manitoba No.1, 254 served as the reference wheat from which all other 
wheat prices were determined.255 However, the negotiations to restore this 
pricing system failed. The major exporters remembered the agressive pricing 
competition which occurred under the International Grains Arrangement. Fur-
ther, Canada was in the process of changing its grading system, and, therefore, 
did not favor designating its wheat as the reference wheat.256 Likewise, the 
United States was unwilling to have its wheat designated because of the possible 
market disadvantage of being locked into a reference price which all other 
exporters would then know.257 In the end, the countries involved were not able 
to agree on pricing provisions or commitments. The final pricing arrangement 
stated only that the parties would reconvene the conference to negotiate substan-
tive pricing provisions when (1) the Canadian grading system was in place, (2) its 
workings in the market grasped, and (3) the international "climate" for agree-
ment had improved.258 The 1971 Wheat Trade Convention contained no pur-
chase and supply obligations. Instead, nations looked for stability in the Interna-
tional Wheat Council's review of the market,259 and in the restraint of the other 
participating countries. 260 
B. The Russian Grain Deal of 1972 
In 1972, any substantive pricing provIsIOns probably would have failed to 
stabilize the international market.261 The Soviet Union's grain production fell 
critically and the Soviet Union shifted domestic policy by purchasing its deficit 
grain in the commercial market,262 instead of cutting back livestock production 
after a poor harvest. This shift caused a tremendous turbulence in the market. 263 
On July 8, 1972, the United States agreed to furnish the Russians with a 
three-year, $750 million credit for the purchase of U.S. grains, including 
254. See note 132 and accompanying text supra. 
255. Hearings on Executive F, supra note 253, at 3. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. International Wheat Agreement of 1971, supra note 250, art. 21. 
259. Hearings on Executive F, supra note 253, at 16. See also International WMatAgreement: Hearing, supra 
note 31, at 24. 
260. Hearings on Executive F, supra note 253, at 16 (testimony of Clarence Palmby, assistant Secretary 
of Agriculture). "[Tlhe existence of the International Wheat Council, and the countries convened there 
and keeping track of one another, has through the years caused restraints to come into being, and it has 
disciplined one nation as against the other .... " Id. 
261. Cj. International Grain Agreement Oversight, supra note 66, at 16; Department Testifies, supra note 
86, at 20. 
262. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO THE CoNGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIAN WHEAT SALES AND WEAKNESSES IN AGRICULTURE'S MANAGEMENT OF 
WHEAT EXPORT SUBSIDY PROGRAM 14 (1973) [hereinafter cited as RUSSIAN WHEAT SALEsl. 
263. !d. 
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wheat. 264 The impetus for this agreement came from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, which feared that wheat exports in 1972 might not reach the levels 
of the previous year.265 However, in spite of indications that the 1972 Russian 
harvest had been poor, the Russian purchase of enormous quantities of grain in 
the commercial market surprised both the Agriculture Department and private 
exporters.266 Russian purchase agreements with private exporters amounted to 
about 440 million bushels of U.S. wheat.267 
This purchase drastically reduced world stocks,268 and the increased demand 
caused world grain prices to increase significantly.269 Farm prices in the United 
States on July 15, 1973 were almost double those of a year earlier.270 The average 
farm price of wheat rose more than eighty percent in one month. 271 However, 
consumer prices also rose drastically, especially in the United States.272 
In addition to higher food prices,273 U.S. taxpayers paid for expensive subsidies 
on the exported wheat274 because export subsidies on wheat grew larger as the 
world demand caused increased domestic prices. The U.S. taxpayer effectively 
subsidized the Russian grain purchases by as much as $150 million. 275 However, 
such increased subsidies were unnecessary to stimulate exports because the 
USSR needed the grain, and also had $750 million in credit from the U.S. 
government. 276 To compound the situation, the Department of Agriculture, 
after decades of wrestling with surpluses, was slow to accept the reality of a 
shortage situation and thus, delayed reduction of the subsidies.277 
The problems which arose as a result of the 1972 sale of grain to the Soviets 
were due primarily to the open-ended option in the 1972 agreement. That 
option specified the price of the grain but did not specify either the quantity278 
264. Grains Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, July 8, 1972, United States-
U.S.S.R., art. 1(1), 2 U.S.T. 1447, T.I.A.S. No. 7423 [hereinafter cited as Grains Agreement]. 
265. RUSSIAN WHEAT SALES, supra note 262, at 13. 
266. [d. at 14. 
267. [d. at 13-14. This figure was more than the total 1972 fiscal year commercial exports combined. 
268. SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 2D. SESS., INTERNATIONAL FOOD RESERVES: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT PROPOSALS 
121 (Comm. Print 1974). 
269. [d. at 120. 
270. [d. 
271. [d. The price rose from $2.47 on July 15, 1973 to $4.45 on August 15, 1973. [d. 
272. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 62: "Food prices rose by over one-third 
between 1971 and 1974." Domestic wheat prices rose from about $1.68 a bushel in July 1972 to $3.00 a 
bushel in May 1973, supra note 262, at 25. 
273. RUSSIAN WHEAT SALES, supra note 262, at 25. 
274. [d. at 60. 
275. [d. at 63. "We estimate that about half the $300 million in subsidy payments will go toward 
compensating exporters who had to cover their Russian sales with high domestic purchase prices." [d. 
276. [d. at 60. 
277. L. Thurow, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY 20 (1980). 
278. Note, The Evolving U.S.-USSR Grain Trading Structure: A Comparison of the 1972 and 1975 Grain 
Agreements, 4 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMPo 227 [hereinafter cited as Evolving U.S.-USSR Grain Trading 
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or the spacing between purchases and shipments over the three-year period.279 
Many commentators have observed that the Soviets historically have been an 
inconsistent force in the world wheat market. 280 Therefore, neither the 1972 
crisis, nor its magnitude, should have surprised the United States. 
The USSR is a major component of the world market and a major 
source of instability ... the USSR is the world's largest wheat 
producer, but the salient feature of Soviet production and imports is 
their instability. In 1972-73 the Soviet Union increased its wheat 
imports by II million tons and the next year they reduced imports by 
roughly the same amount. It has been estimated that Soviet wheat 
imports accounted for 80% of the variability of world wheat imports 
in recent years. Much of the variability of imports is attributable to 
changes in production, but Soviet import policy is an additional 
source of uncertainty. Because Soviet authorities have not permitted 
imports to respond systematically to crop shortfalls, a difficult fore-
casting problem has been made even more complicated.281 
C. The 1975 U.S.-USSR Grain Agreement 
The United States and the Soviet Union entered into another grain agreement 
in 197 5. 2~2 This agreement was concluded despite the problems stemming from 
the 1972 U .S.-USSR grain arrangement, or perhaps, more accurately, as a result 
of those problems. 283 A further impetus to agreement was the U.S. recognition 
of the profound influence the Russians exert on the market whether buying or 
not. 284 This agreement required the USSR to purchase six million metric tons of 
wheat and corn, in approximately equal proportions, in each twelve-month 
period. 285 The Agreement also required the Soviets to space the purchases and 
shipments "as evenly as possible" over the twelve-month period. 2H6 The vague 
term "as evenly as possible" left ample space for differences of opinion. The U.S. 
Structure]. This article states: "[N]o maximum amount of permissible purchases was stipulated. Thus. 
there was nothing in the contract to prevent the Soviet Union from quietly cornering one-quarter of the 
C.S. wheat crop in July and August of 1972." !d. at 238. 
279, Id, "The only timing provision in the Grains Agreement required the Soviet Union to purchase 
at least $200 million of grain for delivery prior to August I, 1973," Id, See Grains Agreement, supra note 
264, art, I, sec. 2, 
280, GRENNES, JOHNSON & THURSBY, supra note 167, at 19, 
281. Id, 
282, Agreement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Supply of 
Grain, Oct. 20, 1975, United States-U,S,S,R" 26 U,ST, 2971, TI.A,S, No, 8206 [hereinafter Agreement 
on Supply of Grain], 
283, Evolving U,S,-USSR Grain Trading Structurf, supra note 278, at 227-28, 
284, GRENNES, JOHN SO" & THURSBY, supra note 167, at 19, 
285, Agreement on Supplv of Grain, supra note 282, art. I(i), 
286, Id, art. Ill. 
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government had the reciprocal obligation to use its good offices to encourage 
these sales by private commercial sources. 287 The Agreement allowed the Soviets 
to purchase an additional two million metric tons of grain annually without 
additional consuitation,288 and also provided that consultation should be held as 
soon as possible should the Soviets desire to purchase or the United States desire 
to sell more grain. 289 
To avoid the problems of a shortfall, the agreement stipulated that should the 
total U.S. grain supply fall below 225 million metric tons, the U.S. government 
may reduce the supply of grain available for purchase by the USSR. 290 By 
requiring equal spacing between the purchases, and by specifying both the 
quantity of grain available for purchase, and a safety margin of supply prerequis-
ite to any sale, the United States hoped to avoid the problems of overbuying 
encountered under the 1972 agreement.291 However, the key to the 1975 
agreement was the provision requiring intergovernmental consultation every six 
months on the progress of the agreement. 292 The parties designed this require-
ment to stabilize the grain trade, protect the interests of both governments, and 
balance the bargaining positions between the U.S. private market economy and 
the USSR's state-planned economy.293 
D. The 1980 Grain Embargo 
Notwithstanding this serious attempt to protect against the potential difficul-
ties of grain trade with the Soviet Union, the agreement's success was contingent 
more upon the political relationship between the two countries than upon the 
draftsmanship of the agreement itself.294 President Carter's suspension of all 
U.S. grain sales to the USSR, in excess of the eight million tons guaranteed 
under the terms of the agreement, proved this point dramatically.295 This action 
287. [d. art. I(ii). 
288. [d. 
289. [d. art. IV. 
290. [d. art. V. 
291. Evolving U.S.-USSR Grain Trading Structure, supra note 278, at 245-46. 
292. Agreement on Supply of Grain, supra note 282, art. VIII. 
293. Evolving U.S.-USSR Grain Trading Structure, supra note 278, at 249. 
294. [d. at 252. 
295. Soviet Trade Restrictions, 16 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 33 Gan. 14, 1980). The Soviet Union 
had planned to import 35 million tons of grain in 1980, 25 million tons of it from the United States. To 
compensate U.S. farmers and exporters for the cancellation of these sales, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture undertook several measures. [d. Firstly, the Commodity Credit Corporation (Ccq as-
sumed the contractual obligations of exporters for the undelivered embargoed grain and eventually 
assumed ownership of 4.2 million tons of wheat and 9 million tons of corn at a cost of about $2 billion. 
Paarlberg, Lessons of the Grain Embargo, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 144, 147-48 [hereinafter cited as Paarlberg). 
The government increased loan prices for wheat and corn in order to guarantee farmers higher prices 
for the grain they sold to the government. Finally, the government raised "release" prices in order to 
1982] INTERNATIONAL WHEAT TRADE 257 
was a U.S. attempt to use its grain as a weapon against the Soviets, theoretically 
punishing the Soviets for their invasion of Afghanistan by withholding needed 
supplies.296 However, the embargo on grain proved to be more of a punishment 
to U.S. farmers and taxpayers since the action did not pressure the Soviets to 
leave Afghanistan.297 
One commentator has stated that in order for any grain embargo to be 
effective, three conditions must be met: 298 (1) foreign policy officials in the 
country imposing the embargo must be able to control the volume and direction 
of their food exports; (2) other countries and transnational corporations must be 
precluded from "leaking" embargoed grain into the target country through 
trans-shipment or deceit; and (3) the loss of food imports must be sufficient to 
generate the desired effects within the political and economic system of the 
target country.299 Although the United States was able to control exports, it was 
not able to control the latter two conditions.30o The Soviet Union overcame the 
effects of the embargo through reliance on its reserves, discovery of new 
suppliers in the world market, and good weather and harvest conditions.30l 
President Reagan opposed the use of the embargo as a weapon302 but waited 
until April 24, 1981, to fulfill his campaign promise to end the embargo.303 
President Reagan had wanted to lift the embargo immediately upon taking 
office, but decided that to do so would send the wrong signal to Moscow at a time 
of possible Soviet intervention in Poland.304 The United States and Soviet 
officials held discussions in June 1981 on a possible grain deal.305 American 
farmers had been anxious for a resumption of the sales to the Soviets,306 and the 
force an increase in market prices. Surplus grain would then be released from the reserve at the higher 
market price. The U.S.D.A. enlarged the farmer-owner reserve program and compensation for grain 
stored on farms was increased. !d. 
296. Paarlberg, supra note 295, at 144. 
297. Soviet Grain Embargo, 17 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 253 (Mar. 9, 1981); Newsweek, May 4, 
1981, at 25, col. 1. 
298. Paarlberg, supra note 295, at 145. 
299. [d. "Like a three-linked chain, the President's 1980 grain embargo had to hold at each of these 
three points, if it was to hold overall. An embargo that fails at anyone of the three will fail altogether." 
[d. 
300. [d. Paarlberg speculates that even if the embargo had succeeded in Conditions One and Two, it, 
nevertheless, probably would have failed at Condition Three, within the Soviet Union. [d. 
301. [d. at 155-59. 
302. Soviet Grain Embargo, 17 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 67-68 (Feb. 2, 1981). President Reagan felt 
that the embargo unfairly asked only one group of Americans, the farmers, to pay the price for the 
United States' stand against the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan. Reagan believed that if this 
kind of weapon had to be used, then it should have been in an across-the-board fashion, in a "kind of 
quarantine." [d. 
303. N.Y. Times, April 25, 1981, at I, col. 6. 
304. [d. The President stated that he felt his decision should be made only when it was dear that the 
Soviets and other nations would not mistakenly think it indicated a weakening of our position. [d. 
305. Chicago Tribune, June 8, 1981, at 8, col. 1. 
306. [d. 
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Reagan administration had said that it was ready to offer 4 to 6 million metric 
tons for shipment in 198 p07 
Despite the failure of the embargo to pressure the Soviets out of Afghanistan, 
the United States may still have benefited from the embargo. If, in response to 
the embargo, the Soviets decrease U.S. grain imports or continue to diversify the 
origin of imports, the unpredictability and turbulent effect of U.S. grain sales to 
the USSR may no longer be a problem.30B However, U.S. wheat exports must 
continue to grow in order for something useful to be salvaged from the embargo 
experience for the United States.309 
IX. OTHER METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
A. Bilateral Agreements 
As a result of past failures of the International Wheat Agreements, the United 
States and other wheat market countries3lo have increasingly used bilateral agree-
ments to stabilize the wheat market.3ll The United States has entered into 
understandings concerning grain trade with Poland, Taiwan, East Germany, 
Japan, Israel and Norway.312 These understandings established a communica-
tions framework between the United States and these countries as opposed to a 
formal contract to supply specific quantities of grain, such as the 1975 Agree-
ment between the United States and the Soviet Union.313 
However, to stabilize the market, bilateral agreements are less preferable than 
a multilateral treaty, such as the International Wheat Agreement, for several 
reasons.314 First, bilateral agreements which are flexible enough to accommodate 
unforeseen circumstances, yet firm enough to provide a useful basis for long-
range planning, are difficult to draft.315 Bilateral agreements can also hinder 
competition in the free market by limiting the number of participants in the 
market. 316 For this reason, the agreements may be inconsistent with the spirit 
307. !d. 
308. Paarlberg, supra note 295, at 162. The Soviets have begun formally to restructure some of their 
grain imports, for example, by concluding a comprehensive trade package with Brazil which includes 
large-scale Soviet purchases of Brazilian grain in return for sharply increased Soviet oil deliveries to 
Brazil. The Boston Globe, Aug. 8, 1981, at 1, col. 6. 
309. Paarlberg, supra note 295, at 162. 
310. GOODWIN & MAYALL, supra note 245, at 77. 
311. International Grains Agreements Oversight, supra note 66, at 4. 
312. [d. 
313. [d. 
314. International Wheat Agreement: Hearing, supra note 31, at 50-51; International Grain Agreements 
Oversight, supra note 66, at 93. 
315. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 71. 
316.Id. 
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and intent of the GATT objective of free trade.:l17 In addition, problems would 
arise in the implementation of a bilateral agreement in free market systems, such 
as the United States, since the government has only limited capability in a free 
market to guarantee price, supply or delivery terms. 3lB 
Most significantly the usefulness of bilateral agreements is limited in the 
international market. These agreements do not provide the internationally 
coordinated effort necessary to balance supply and demand. 319 Limiting the 
number of parties to an agreement potentially hampers competition in the free 
market. Further, nations not included in such agreements would essentially 
become claimants for whatever grain remained after the bilateral agreements 
had been fulfilled.320 Therefore, to insure an adequate supply of wheat and an 
equitable price for wheat producers on an international level, cooperation of a 
wider scope than that envisioned under bilateral agreements is necessary.321 
B. Wheat Exporters' Cartel 
An alternative proposal to solving the wheat trade problems is the formation 
of a cartel among the major wheat exporting countries. 322 Political and farm 
leaders in both the United States and Canada have seriously considered this 
possibility.323 Under such a plan, the producer countries would form a commod-
ity cartel to control the supply and demand of wheat. 324 In the short run, a wheat 
cartel would probably increase export revenues of the exporting nations. How-
317. Id. In a light market situation, nations not fortunate enough to be a party to a bilateral 
agreement could have trouble satisfying their import needs. Moreover, the nations most vulnerable in 
this regard ofIentimes are the developing nations which are least able to afford or compele for scarce 
supplies. Id. 
318. International Crains Agreement Oversight, supra note 66, at 4. 
319. See Katz, supra note 56, at 2, 4. See also GOODWIN & MAYALL, supra note 245, at 78. "While in Ihe 
technical sense any bilateral agreement, particularly one which is not formalized in treaty form, would 
be superceded by an international treaty, such bilateral arrangements tend to reduce the incentive to 
move towards an internationally co-ordinated reserve or reserve/price stabilization scheme." [d. 
Id. 
320. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 71. 
321. International Crain Agreements Oversight, supra note 66, at 18. 
Basically our approach has been that the way to maintain some kind of reasonable price range 
is basically to affect [supply] and demand. Therefore. in periods of excess supply, it seems to us 
that it only makes sense that there ought to be stock accumulation, and since this costs money. 
that this ought to be born by both exporting and importing countries. In periods of extremely 
short supply, this ought to be available to world markets so that people can maintain their 
consumption levels. 
322. Terpstra, A n A nalysis of Possible Cartel and Barter A rrangements to Influence the Price and Availability 
of Wheat on the International Market, reprinted in International Crains Agreements Oversight, supra note 66, at 
58 [hereinafter cited as Terpstra]. 
323. Schmitz & McCalla, Analysis of Imperfections in International Trade: The Case of Crain Export Cartels, 
in IMPERFECT MARKETS IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE 70 (A. McCalla & T. Josling eds. 1981). 
324. Terpstra, supra note 322, at 66. 
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ever, this result would depend on their political will to form and maintain a cartel 
arrangement. 325 In order for a commodity cartel to be successful, both supply 
and demand must be relatively price inelastic. Without such inelasticity, an 
increase in price could result in either a consumer boycott, consumer substitu-
tion of another product, or an increase in production by new or current produc-
ers. 326 A cartel's success is also more likely when327: (1) the market contains a 
small number of producers selling to a large number of buyers;328 (2) the 
commodity is homogeneous so that different grades are not important to 
buyers;329 (3) the commodity can be easily and inexpensively stored by the 
producer;33o (4) unity of purpose and policy among the exporters entering into 
the cartel arrangement exists;331 and (5) no special arrangements exist between 
individual cartel members and an importing country.332 
In the case of wheat, a cartel of the exporting countries would find it difficult, 
if not impossible, to meet these requirements. In the long term, supply and 
demand inelasticity would break down because nations would lower their de-
mand for wheat imports by increasing their domestic production and substitut-
ing other grains for wheat.333 Moreover, although four countries334 account for 
approximately 80% of the world export, they account for only one-fifth of the 
world's wheat production.335 Thus, as much as four-fifths of the world's produc-
tion capacity would be outside the control of the cartel. 
Several other obstacles make formation of a wheat cartel difficult. Wheat is not 
a perfectly homogeneous commodity.336 The degree of substitutability between 
differing grades and varieties of wheat and other coarse grains is increasing. 337 
Any cartel arrangement would need to be broad, therefore, since it is more 
difficult to control wheat supply and price, the greater the degree of substituta-
bility between wheat controlled by the cartel and wheat which falls beyond the 
cartel's control.338 Storage of wheat is expensive and a cartel would require 
additional storage capacity.339 
The capacity of the four leading exporters to agree on purpose and policy is 
325. Multilateral Trade Negotintions Briefing, supra note 49, at 33. 
326. Terpstra, supra note 322, at 66. See § II supra. 
327. Terpstra, supra note 322, at 66. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. 
331. !d. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. at 58. 
334. The four countries are Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States. International Wheat 
Agreement: Hearing, supra note 31, at 17. 
335. Id. 
336. GOODWIN & MAYALL, supra note 245, at 77. 
337. Id. 
338. !d. 
339. Terpstra, supra note 322, at 67. 
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doubtful, due to several factors. 34o First, the United States would have to modify 
the present American trading system before it could participate in a cartel 
arrangement. Unlike Australia, Canada, and Argentina, the United States has no 
national grain exporting body,341 and therefore, the United States has limited 
capability under its present market to guarantee supply, price or delivery 
terms. 342 The impetus to form a cartel may also be weakened since individually, 
cartel members could be faced with significant repercussions in the form of 
retaliatory trade restrictions imposed by resentful importers. 343 Then, too, na-
tions are reluctant to relinquish even a part of their control over domestic 
agricultural and export policies,344 further diminishing the probability of a 
successful cartel being formed. 345 
Notwithstanding the factors which militate against formation of a cartel, an 
association of the wheat exporting countries to improve communication, rather 
than fix prices, could be valuable to both exporters and importers. 346 A pro-
ducer's union, though not as beneficial as a successful International Wheat 
Agreement of both exporters and importers, might be able to agree on general 
guidelines to establish wheat reserves, to coordinate production and supply 
adjustment policies and to enhance the market stability.347 
X. THE PRESENT 
A. The Challenge 
Both farmers and government officials have learned valuable, albeit painful, 
lessons from the events of the past fifteen years in the world grain trade. The 
340. Id. 
341. Id. 
342. International Grains Agreement Oversight, supra note 66, at 4. 
Another element to be considered is the fundamentally different nature of the U.S. wheat 
marketing system - which is conducted by the private sector - and those of our principle 
competitors ranging from Argentina's largely private trading, to Canada's mixed publici 
private sector, and Australia's public sector control of the wheat trade. Integrating these 
different marketing systems into a tightly coordinated mechanism would be difficult if not 
impossible. 
International Wheat Agreement: Hearing, supra note 31, at 53. 
343. Terpstra, supra note 322, at 67-68. 
344. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFtCE, supra note 42, at 63-64. 
345. International Wheat Agreement: Hearing, supra note 31, at 53. 
346. Id. 
347. Id. See International Grain Agreements Oversight, supra note 66, at 10 (Mr. Dale Hathaway, Under-
Secretary of Agriculture). 
We have, as the chairman suggested, initiated a series of consultations with the other exporters 
in terms of closer collaboration and discussion of marketing policies and related matters, 
including, potentially, reserve policies that might be followed under the different systems-
and the systems do differ markedly and thus, one has to recognize that a complete parallelism 
will never exist. 
Id. at 15-16. Increased cooperation and communication between exporters would also avert panic and 
dumping in a falling market situation through increasing awareness and understanding of world 
production and supply and demand conditions. Id. 
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intense price cutting, which occurred during the International Grains Arrange-
ment,348 demonstrated the dangers of narrow price bands and over-rigidity to an 
international agreement.349 During the next five years, from 1972-1977, the 
world wheat situation changed from one of great scarcity, following the poor 
Soviet harvest and the large Soviet grain purchases in the world market in 1972, 
to one of market depressing excess supply.350 Since 1977, the grain trade has 
been increasingly politicized351 and there has been increasing discussion of the 
use of wheat as a weapon.352 The U.S. grain embargo against the USSR is an 
example. 353 Because world wheat consumption will increase, and weather and 
other natural conditions always remain uncertain, experts foresee recurring 
variances in the world's supply of grain. 354 Thus, any new International Wheat 
Agreement faces enormous challenges. 
B. Attempts at A New International Wheat Agreement 
In January 1925, the International Wheat Council began preparations for 
discussions on a new International Wheat Agreement.355 The discussions lacked 
348. See notes 213-17 and accompanying text supra. 
349. Department Testifies, supra note 86, at 20. 
350. Id. 
351. GOODWIN & MAYALL, supra note 245, at 80-82. See also WALLERSTEIN, supra note 201, at 218-20 
(discussion of the increasing use of food aid as a foreign policy instrument); International Grain 
Agreements Oversight, supra note 66, at 20 (statement of Joseph Ha10w, Executive Director, North 
American Export Grain Association, Inc.). One large U.S. wheat producers organization, the North 
American Export Grain Association, feels that the only real benefits to be derived from the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreements are political in nature. "We have for many years supported the concept of an 
International Wheat Agreement because we felt that this had, of course, some political benefit. We do 
not feel that there really is a great deal of economic benefit except, of course, as it is affected by politics." 
Id. 
352. GOODWIN & MAYALL, supra note 245, at 80-82; Morgan, The Politics of Grain, THE ATLANTIC 
29-34 (july 1980) [hereinafter cited as The Politics of Grain]. "[T]here was a recognition that grain is an 
element of national security in the broadest sense, and that it will remain so in the world being 
transformed by the politics of the 1980's." !d. at 29. 
353. See 45 Fed. Reg. 1,883 (1980) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §§ 376, 386,399). This Executive Order 
placed agricultural exports to the USSR on the Commodity Control List, a list which consists of goods 
and technology subject to control under the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.c. app. 
§§ 2401-2413 (1980). Specifically, the 8 million metric tons of grain already under contract to the Soviets 
pursuant to the 1975 Agreement (see note 282 and accompanying text supra) was shipped, but the 
non-binding commitment under the 1976 agreement to export an additional 17 million was cancelled. 
See Paarlberg, supra note 295, at 144. 
354. Department Testifies, supra note 86, at 20. OECD estimates that, with the expected increases in 
demand (2-3% each year, mostly from developing countries) the margin of security in the current level 
of world supply capacity may decline rather than increase. OECD, supra note 2, at 11. OECD points out 
that instability in the world market could increase because the risk absorbing capacity and the buffering 
capability of the United States, with respect to turbulence in the world market is shrinking and seems 
likely to continue to do so. !d. at 13. The size and the nature of the market is such that the United States 
can no longer stabilize the market alone, and, therefore, other exporters must shoulder some of the 
burden. !d. at 14. 
355. MuuiialRrai Trade Negotiations Briefing, supra note 49, at 29. Intensive negotiations were then 
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any real momentum until June 1977.356 The parties pursued an agreement 
which would stabilize prices. However, rather than using a price-fixing structure, 
negotiators sought to stabilize prices through a system of nationally held re-
serves. According to this plan, nations would accumulate reserves when world 
prices were low and release them when prices were high. 357 Under the Agree-
ment, nations also would have utilized production controls to stabilize the market 
in the event that the reserve action failed to do SO.3SS Despite agreement upon 
this basic plan, negotiations stalled in February 1979 because of three unresolved 
issues: 359 (l) the size of the reserves or individual countries' shares of them; 360 (2) 
the price levels for reserve stock accumulation and release;361 and (3) the special 
provisions for developing countries with respect to the accumulation and release 
of reserves, and the inclusion of foreign aid transfers to benefit developing 
countries.362 
Some developing and importing countries insisted on unrealistically low re-
lease levels which would have resulted in inadequate producer returns at the 
bottom of the price range. 363 Producers complained that the 18 million ton stock 
size under consideration 364 and an early release at the upper level would leave 
producers powerless to mitigate extreme price increases because of quickly 
disappearing stocks. 3fi5 The reserve scheme offered these countries supply secu-
rity and a price ceiling in return for a guarantee of an adequate price fioor to the 
producers. This disagreement demonstrated, therefore, the shortsightedness of 
some of the developing and importing countries.366 However, the basic dis-
agreement stems from a difference in market outlooks.367 Many of the develop-
ing and importing countries were reluctant to make concessions because they 
conducted, first in London under the auspices of the International Wheat Council and thell in Geneva 
under the aegis of CNCTAD. The negotiating conference is formally known as United Nations 
Conference to Negotiate an International Arrangement to Replace the International Wheat Agree-
ment, 1971, as extended. Id. at 34. 
356. Id. at 34. 
357. Graham, supra note 165, at 35. 
358. Id. 
359. International Wheat Agreement: Hearing, supra note 31, at 15. 
360. Graham,supra note 165, at 35. The United States and the other exporters, together with most of 
the developing countries. had supported a total reserve figure of approximately 30 million tons. 
International Wheat Agreement: Hmnng, supra note 31, at 15-16. The exporters deemed this reserve figure 
necessary in orch-r to maintain world price stability and also adequate food security. Prior to the 
breakdown in negotiations, countries had pledged only 18 million tons, 4 million tons of which were 
pledged by countries highly unlikely to release them to the market. Id. 
361. International Wheat Agreement: Hearing, supra note 31, at 16. 
362. Id. The special provisions presented an administrative nightmare, and the indusion of aid 
commitments in a commercial wheat treaty was viewed as undesirable. [d. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. 
365. Id. 
366. Multilateral Trade Negotiations Briefing, supra note 49, at 29-30, 35. 
367. Id. at 30. 
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expected the market to return to a condition of chronic oversupply.368 The 
United States and other exporters, on the other hand, believed in the market's 
potential for greater variability. Therefore, they favored cooperation at both 
ends of the price range to alleviate stress at either end.369 The Conference ended 
with the parties passing a resolution calling for a fifth extension of the 1971 IWA 
and continuing consultations between countries. 370 
A Special Committee of twelve nations, appointed by the International Wheat 
Council, met in the fall of 1979 and the spring of 1980 to explore alternative 
approaches to a new Wheat Trade Convention. The Committee used the areas 
of consensus developed during the International Wheat Agreement negotiations 
as a foundation. 371 Rather than recommending specific price levels for the ac-
cumulation and release of reserve stocks, the Special Committee favored a more 
flexible arrangement with the Wheat Council in a consultative role. 372 In this 
role, the Council would recommend reserve stock actions and other measures 
designed to influence the supply and demand of wheat in times of market 
stress. 373 Though the comprehensive agreement on reserves originally sought in 
the International Wheat Agreement negotiations proved to be too ambitious for 
governments to accept,374 the nations of the Special Committee reached enough 
of a consensus to permit advancement of this alternative plan. 
XI. THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) was conducted 
under the aegis of GATT. At these negotiations, participants sought to 
strengthen the application of the GATT rules375 concerning agricultural trade, 
and thereby improve the wheat trade. 376 The United States sought assurances 
368. [d. at 30-31. 
369. [d. at 30. 
370. [d. The parties to the Wheat Trade Convention of the International Wheat Agreement of 1971, 
supra note 250, extended the Agreement in its original form in 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978, and 1979. 
However, a new Food Aid Convention was negotiated in 1980 to replace the old Food Aid Convention. 
S" note 407 infra. Both agreements expired on June 30, 1981. [d. 
371. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1971 INTERNATIONAL WHEAT AGREEMENT EXTENSION, 
S. REP. No. 44, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980). 
372. [d. 
373. [d. 
374. [d. "Governments were simply not prepared to move far enough and fast enough for these 
negotiations to be successful." [d. 
375. Among the most important GATT provisions to be discussed at the MTN were Article XI(2) 
which permits the imposition of quotas in certain circumstances, GATT, supra note 95, art. XI(2), and 
Article XVI(3) which prohibits the use of subsidies on the export of primary products. GATT, supra 
note 95, art. XVI(3). 
376. Graham, supra note 165, at 32. Multilateral Trade Negotiations participants were to have 
reviewed the results of the UNCTAD wheat agreement negotiations to determine whether the negotia-
tions achieved the "crucial agricultural balance," a balance between the sometimes conflicting goals of 
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that competition between itself and other exporting nations for third country 
wheat markets would be reasonably fair.377 A crucial aspect of this assurance 
involved the GATT provisions on the use of export subsidies. 378 Prior to the 
MTN, the GATT rules concerning agricultural subsidies were vague. The rules 
merely stated that the contracting parties "should seek to avoid the use of 
subsidies on the export of primary products."379 The GATT rules also required 
that subsidies "shall not be applied in a manner which results in the contracting 
party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that prod-
UCt."380 
At the MTN, countries of the European Community, and other countries 
employing subsidy measures were reluctant to negotiate on the subsidy issues. 38 ! 
However, U.S. concern over these subsidies was intense. That concern is best 
exemplified in Great Plains Wheat's382 complaint.383 filed with the Special Trade 
Representative pursuant to Section 301 (a) (3) of the Trade Act of 1974.384 The 
assuring market access for exports. international price and supply stabilization, fair competitive condi-
tions among exporters to third-country markets and the overall application of the international trading 
rules to agriculture. See id. at 34-35. 
377. Id. at 32. 
378. Id. at 34. For the main GATT provisions dealing with subsidies see GATT, supra note 95, arts. 
XVI, VI, XXIII. Much of the discussion at the Multilateral Trade Negotiations was concerned with the 
EEC's use of subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy. See note 167 and accompanying text 
supra. Through the use of the variable import levy mechanism, the EEC protects domestic producers 
"by raising import prices of grains to equal domestic support prices, regardless of the world price." 
VARIABLE LEVIEs,supra note 37, at 1. The revenue collected by the EEC on grain imports is then used to 
defray the expense of EEC subsidies on its grain exports. See Multilateral Trade Negotiations Briefing, supra 
note 49, at 644. During the week of April 17, 1979, the EEC variable import levy collected on 
third-country wheat imports reached a record high of$179.49 per metric ton or $4.88 per bushel. The 
landed price for U.S. wheat in Rotterdam, the major Western European grain port, was only $150.50 
per metric ton or $4.10 per bushel. Thus, the EEC consumer paid an import levy greater (119% higher) 
than the landed commercial value of the U.S. wheat. See id. at 643. 
379. GATT, supra note 95, art. XVI(3). 
380. Id. 
381. Graham, supra note 165, at 34. 
N ontariff trade barriers are not easily resolved through international negotiation since they 
are either official extensions of non-negotiable domestic policies or applied unofficially - even 
covertly from deep within government bureaucracies. They are also considered to be outside 
the basic purview of traditional multilateral and bilateral negotiating schemes. 
Houck, U.S. Agricultural Trade and the Tokyo Round, 12 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 265, 270 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Houck]. 
382. Great Plains Wheat is a U.S. wheat export organization. 
383. Great Plains Wheat Complaint with the Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
Docket No. 301-16 [hereinafter cited as Great Plains Wheat Complaint). For the text of the Great Plains 
Wheat Complaint see 43 Fed. Reg. 59,935 (1978). The complaint was filed with the Chairman of the 
Section 301 (Unfair Trade Practices) Committee in November, 1978. 
384. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411, is used generally to enforce U.S. rights 
under all of the agreements reached in the MTN. In the case of subsidies, the statute can also be used to 
seek relief from a subsidy granted by a country which does not adhere to subsidies agreements. Id. In 
addition, § 301 can also be used to respond to any foreign act, policy or practice which is "unjustifiable, 
unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce." 1 U.S. DEP'T OF 
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complaint alleged that the European Community unjustifiably used export sub-
sidies in contravention of Article XVI:3 of the GATT.385 The complaint further 
alleged that the subsidized EC wheat exports had displaced U.S. wheat exports in 
third world markets.386 United States and EC representatives held consultations 
in July 1979, to ensure that EC subsidy practice during the 1979/1980 market-
ing year would be consistent with Article XVI:3 of the GATT.387 On January I, 
1980, while this complaint was pending, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade: Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI. and XXIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,388 which was negotiated during the 
Tokyo Round of negotiations, became effective. 389 
The "Subsidies Code,"390 set forth certain criteria that export subsidies on 
primary products must meet in order to be legal. 391 The Subsidies Code clarified 
the Article XVI prohibition of export subsidies which result in a country's 
gaining more than an "equitable share of world export trade" so as to forbid 
expressly one signatory country from granting subsidies that would displace the 
exports of another signatory.392 Moreover, signatories agreed "not to grant 
export subsidies on exports of certain primary products to a particular market in 
a manner which results in prices materially below those of other suppliers to the 
COMMERCE, SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SUBSIDIES AND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES]. Furthermore, § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (amended 1979), "gives a 
private party a right to file a formal (emphasis in original) petition with the USTR (U.S. Trade 
Representative) against any act, policy or obligations of the U.S. government under the Code. The 
statute ... gives the USTR discretion in deciding whether to initiate a case under Section 301." 
SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, supra, at 13. 
385. Great Plains Wheat Complaint, supra note 383. 
386. Id. In the complaint, Great Plains Wheat estimates that the EEGs subsidy practices increased its 
commercial wheat exports by approximately 4.4 million metric tons, 75% of which would have been 
accounted for by the United States had the EEC not subsidized the wheat. Therefore, by this estimate, 
the United States lost 3.3 million metric tons in grain export volume. The total loss of export earnings is 
estimated at $885 million. U.S. markets allegedly displaced include: Brazil, Egypt, Finland, Morocco, 
People's Republic of China, Poland and Portugal. See id. at 59, 936-37. 
387. Article XVI:3 of GATT, see note 95 supra, has been interpreted as providing, in pertinent part 
that: 
[the] signatories agree not to grant directly or indirectly any export subsidy on certain primary 
products in a manner which results in the signatory granting such subsidy having more than an 
equitable share of the world export trade in such product, account being taken of the share of 
the signatories in trade in the product concerned during a previous representative period, and 
any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting trade in such product. 
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, art. 10, Apr. 12, 1979, _ U.S.T. _, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, _ U.N.T.S. _ [hereinafter cited as 
Interpretation and Application]. See Great Plains Wheat, Inc.; Termination of Investigation, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 49,428 (1980). 
388. Interpretation and Application, supra note 387. 
389. Id. The treaty was entered into force January I, 1980. 
390. SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, supra note 384, at 2, uses "Subsidies Code" as the 
popular name for the formal agreement. 
391. [d. at 3. 
392. Interpretation and Application, supra note 387, art. 1O(2)(a). 
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same market."3H3 U.S. and EC officials met again on June 12, 1980, in Brussels, 
where they agreed to jointly monitor developments in world wheat trade, ex-
change information, and discuss any future world wheat trade problems which 
arose.394 On the basis of these negotiations and the cooperation established 
between the EC and the United States for dealing with problems, the U.S. Trade 
Representative, pursuant to the advice of the Section 301 Committee, termi-
nated the investigation of the Great Plains Wheat complaint. 39s 
XII. ANALYSIS 
The orderly resolution of the Great Plains Wheat complaint without retalia-
tory measures is an encouraging development for international cooperation in 
wheat trade. 396 However, at the Tokyo Round of negotiations, the United States 
discovered that an EC commitment to increase imports and improve U.S. access 
to the European market can only be secured within the context of the EC's 
Common Agricultural Policy.397 
Despite the GATT's expressed liberal trade objective,398 experts believe that 
because of CAP's protective nature any limitations upon the basic restrictive 
provisions of the Common Agricultural Policy are non-negotiable. 39H The highly 
protective variable import levy keeps American wheat uncompetitive in Euro-
pean markets. Yet, European negotiators are not anxious to negotiate this issue 
because the levy protects EC wheat producers. 4oo Not only does the EC wheat 
export subsidy isolate European markets and displace other markets, but it also 
adversely effects the world price of wheat to the detriment of world produc-
ers.401 Other producing nations must discount the export price of wheat, some-
times as much as $10.00 U.S. to $15.00 U.S. per ton402 in order to compete with 
EC subsidized wheat exports. One major U.S. export group analogizes the EC 
wheat export subsidy to "dropping a price pebble in a placid pond."403 The 
profound price effect of these subsidies caused producer organizations such as 
393. [d. art. 10(3). 
394. Great Plains Wheat, Inc.; Termination of Investigation, 45 Fed. Reg. 49,428 (1980). 
395. [d. 
396. Great Plains Wheat Complaint, supra note 383, at 59,937. 
397. Graham, supra note 165, at 34. On the Common Agricultural Policy, see note 167 and accom-
panying text supra. 
398. See note 96-97 and accompanying text supra. 
399. [d. 
400. Houck. supra note 381, at 279. 
401. Multilateral Trade Negotiations Briefing, supra note 49, at 645 (statement of Michael L. Hall, 
President, Great Plains Wheat, Inc.). 
402. [d. The EEC subsidy in effect during this period Uanuary 1979) was a record high $131.20 per 
metric ton, and was approximately equal to the commercial value of the wheat at port shipping positions 
in Europe. [d. 
403. [d. 
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Great Plains Wheat to seek an outright prohibition against subsidies in the 
Subsidies Code.404 As a result of the lack of either an outright prohibition or any 
real restriction on subsidy use in the Subsidies Code, Great Plains Wheat advo-
cated that the United States adopt a selective wheat export subsidy program to 
offset and counteract the subsidies imposed by competitors. 405 
In light of the turbulence of the last fifteen years in the wheat market, 
proponents of International Wheat Agreements can draw much hope from the 
continued willingness of nations to adopt such agreements and to negotiate 
toward better ones. A conference in early 1981 adopted new protocol agree-
ments for the Extension of the Wheat Trade Convention, 1971 406 and the Food 
Aid Convention, 1980407 (the two Coventions constituting the International 
Wheat Agreement of 1971).408 The protocol agreements409 further extended the 
International Wheat Agreement of 1971 410 from July 1, 1981 through June 30, 
1983.411 Like the previous extensions, this extension "maintains the framework 
for international cooperation in wheat matters."412 Accordingly, the Interna-
tional Wheat Council will contin'ue to collect, analyze, and distribute information 
concerning prices, demand, supplies and trade. 413 The Council will also continue 
to provide a forum for the discussion and resolution of world wheat trade 
problems. 414 
The extension of the Food Aid Convention of 1980 "maintains the parties' 
present commitments to provide minimum annual quantities of cereals [sic 1 
food aid to needy developing countries."415 The Convention's objective is to 
annually collect and distribute, through cooperative international effort, at least 
ten million tons of cereals aid to developing countries. 416 The adoption of the 
new GATT "Subsidies Code" also has generated optimism in the world wheat 
404. Id. Great Plains Wheat also points to the use of "qualitative criteria" in the language of the 
Subsidies Code, see Interpretation and Application, supra note 387, and the lack of precision or 
specificity as a demonstration of the unwillingness of some major exporters to participate in an 
agreement which would honestly curtail their use of export subsidies. Id. 
405. Id. 
406. International Wheat Agreement of 1971, supra note 250. 
407. Food Aid Convention, 1980, Mar. 6, 1980, _ V.S.T. _, T.I.A.S. No. 10015, _ V.N.T.S. _. 
408. 1981 Protocols for the Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, Message from the President 
of the United States, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. xxx (1981) [hereinafter cited as Message from the President]. A 
conference meeting in London adopted the protocols on March 6, 1981, and opened them for signature 
in Washington from March 24, 1981 through May 15, 1981. 
409. 1981 Protocols for the Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971 reprinted in 
Message from the President, supra note 408, at I [hereinafter cited as 1981 Protocols]. 
410. International Wheat Agreement of 1971, supra note 250. 
411. 1981 Protocols, supra note 409, art. I. 
412. Message from the President, supra note 408, at xxx. 
413. Id. 
414. Id. 
415. Id. at v. 
416. Id. 
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trade.417 The adoption of the Subsidies Code implies recognition by the world's 
trading nations of the harmful effects of subsidies on international trade. 418 The 
Code represents a positive step by the international trading community to limit 
or reduce the harmful effects which subsidies have on world trade. 419 
Yet, serious problems remain unsolved in the world wheat trade. Despite the 
desirability of using the multilateral International Wheat Agreement approach 
to wheat trade regulation, bilateral agreements have been used increasingly in 
recent years. 420 In addition, the idea of forming a wheat exporters' cartel has not 
vanished421 nor has the idea of using grain as a weapon completely disap-
peared. 422 I ndeed, contrary to GATT free trade principles,423 the United States 
is considering a proposal424 for use of a variable export levy,425 similar to the 
EC'S.426 Theoretically, such a levy would insulate the American economy from 
"transitory surges in foreign demand for grain," by leaving the American grain 
market open to the world market only when prices were within a predetermined 
stabilization band.427 Given the United States' dominant position in the world 
wheat market, use of such a system would destroy any impetus for adoption of a 
comprehensive, workable International Wheat Agreement. 
Moreover, certain constant factors in the wheat trade that can never be solved 
by agreement may become more and more important in the future. Weather will 
always be a variable in wheat trade. 428 The United States also must be concerned 
with its soil resources. 429 Much U.S. farmland is in deteriorating condition as a 
result of overcropping and excessive use of chemicals. 430 Many non-renewable 
or not easily renewable resources such as oil, gas and water are necessary to 
produce grain. 431 The present U.S. farming system makes little provision for the 
finite nature of these resources. 432 Any attempt at regulating the international 
wheat market will have to consider these factors. 
417. Interpretation and Application, supra note 387. 
418. SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES. supra note 384, at 1. 
419. Id. 
420. See Boston Globe, Aug. 8, 1981, at 1. col. 6 (Soviet-Brazilian grain deal); Agreement on Grain 
Trade Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China, Oct. 22, 1980, _ U.S.T. _, T.I.A.S. No. 9930. 
421. International Grains Agreement Oversight, supra note 66, at 66-68. 
422. The Politics of Grain. supra note 352, at 29. 
423. JACKSON, supra note 96, at 729. 
424. Chambers & Wolverton, Wheat Cartelization and Domestic Markets, AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 629 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Chambers & Wolverton]. 
425. See note 167 and accompanying text supra. 
426. Id. 
427. Chambers & Wolverton, supra note 424, at 631. 
428. INTERNATIONAL FOOD RESERVES, supra note 5, at 30. 
429. Soth, The Grain Export Boom, FOREIGN AFF. 895, 898 (1981). 
430. Id. at 904. 
431. The Politics of Grain, supra note 352, at 31. 
432. Id. 
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XIII. CONCLUSION 
The failure of the International Wheat Agreement negotiations to reach an 
understanding upon the proposed comprehensive Wheat Trade Convention is a 
disappointment. However, with international cooperation, a truly effective 
internationally integrated system for monitoring production could be developed 
that would help assure the availability of an adequate supply of wheat and 
guarantee an adequate return to producers. This system would not unduly 
infringe upon the GATT free trade ideal, nor impede the growth of the agricul-
tural self-sufficiency in developing countries. Most importantly, such a system 
would adequately provide for the hungry of the world through the development 
of a world food reserve. The International Wheat Agreements have pursued 
these goals, but so far have not achieved much success, primarily because the 
parties to the agreements have lacked a truly cooperative spirit. A country's 
reluctance to relinquish any part of its control over domestic agricultural policies 
is understandable. Nevertheless, without a broader perception of self-interest, 
and a recognition of the interdependence of domestic policies at the interna-
tional level, a new International Wheat Agreement is not likely to be any more 
successful than those of the past. 
Colleen M. O'Connor 
